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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 930146-CA 
V, : 
JACK D. BROCKSMITH, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from judgment and sentence entered upon 
unconditional pleas of guilty to six counts of communications 
fraud, all second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-1801 (1990)-1 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Defendant claims to challenge the propriety of the 
trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, 
claiming that withdrawal was warranted based on the State's 
alleged violation of: 1) defendant's statutory speedy trial 
rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-29-5, et seq. (1990); 2) defendant's constitutional 
speedy trial rights under the state and federal constitutions; 
xAfter commission of the offenses in this case, and before 
entry of defendant's guilty pleas, section 76-10-1801 was amended, 
effective April 23, 1990. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (Supp. 
1993). The amendment is not relevant to this case. 
and 3) defendant's due process and equal protection rights, which 
were violated by the State's alleged failure to comply with 
various procedural laws and rules. 
Appellate courts review a trial court's ultimate 
decision to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea using an 
abuse of discretion standard, while the underlying factual 
findings will not beset aside unless they are clearly erroneous. 
State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 670 (Utah App. 1993) . However, 
this Court need not review the merits of any of defendant's 
claims because: 1) defendant waived the issues, both expressly 
and by entry of his unconditional guilty pleas, State ex rel. 
E.G.T., 808 P.2d 138, 139 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Sery, 758 
P.2d 935, 937-38 (Utah App. 1988); 2) he failed to advance any of 
the arguments in support of his motion to withdraw his pleas 
below; and 3) he fails to allege either plain error or 
exceptional circumstances to excuse his waiver. State v. 
Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 705 n.2 (Utah App. 1993); State v. 
Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 917-18 (Utah App. 1992); State v. 
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 925 (Utah App. 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The text of any relevant constitutional, statutory, or 
rule provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issue 
presented on appeal is contained in either the body or the 
addendum of this brief. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Because the chronology of the proceedings in this 
matter is critical in applying the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers Act (IAD), the relevant dates and corresponding facts 
are as follows:2 
July 11, 1989 Defendant is arrested in Utah on an 
Illinois warrant for felony theft (R. 241-42, 
287-89, 297, 595). 
Aug. 14, 1989 A governor's warrant is issued in Utah (R. 
242, 292) . 
Aug. 25, 1989 Utah's circuit court issues an order 
releasing def to Illinois authorities (R. 
242, 293). Defendant remains in Utah to 
participate in plea negotiations relating to 
anticipated Utah felony charges (242, 297 
-99) . 
Oct. 5, 1989 Pursuant to the plea negotiations, Utah files 
an information and an affidavit of probable 
cause (case no. 891001140), charging 
defendant with nineteen counts of 
communications fraud and theft by deception 
(R. 242-43, 298-99, 595). 
Oct. 10, 1989 Defendant is bound over to district court (R. 
243) . 
Oct. 19, 1989 Defendant is arraigned (case no. 891000111 
FS) (R. 243, 299). Instead of pleading 
guilty as he had agreed, he enters a plea of 
not guilty (R. 243, 299, 513, 595; Transcript 
of September 24, 1992, hearing [hereinafter 
"Tr.»] at 28-29) . 
Oct. 24, 1989 Counsel for the parties conduct a joint 
telephone conversation in which defendant's 
counsel says defendant does not object to 
entry of an ex parte order of dismissal 
without prejudice, sought by the State 
2
 Because the entire text of the IAD, including all articles 
and subsections, is codified at section 77-29-5, the statute will 
be cited herein as "IAD, Art. (_)." A copy of the statute is 
attached in Addendum A.. 
3 
because of defendant's plea of not guilty (R. 
244, 304). 
Nov. 6, 1989 Defendant is transferred to Illinois custody, 
and is placed in the Mercer County Jail on 
Nov. 11 (R. 246). The State files its motion 
to dismiss case no. 891000111 FS, explaining 
in detail the reasons for the motion (R. 243 
-46, 294-304). The district court orders 
dismissal without prejudice (R. 246, 306-07, 
596-97). 
Dec. 21, 1989 After further investigation, Utah files a new 
information in the circuit court in Cache 
County (case no. 891001462), charging 
defendant with fifteen counts of 
communication fraud and theft by deception 
(R. 1-8, 246-47, 340, 597) . 
Feb. 7, 1990 Defendant files with the Mercer County 
Sheriff a written request for final 
disposition "of all charges pending in Utah" 
(R. 247, 308, 597). Addendum B. He is told 
by both Illinois and Utah authorities that 
the letter is premature and ineffective (R. 
247-48, 309-11, 598; Tr. 4-5). The Utah 
prosecutor receives the letter on March 12 
(R. 247). 
Mar. 26, 1990 Because of defendant's correspondence, the 
Utah district court holds a sua sponte 
hearing in the dismissed case (case no. 
891000111 FS), without notice, because of 
defendant's correspondence and satisfies 
itself that the Illinois charges must be 
determined before Utah can act (R. 24 8, 314, 
340-41, 498; Transcript of Mar. 26, 1990, 
hearing at 1). 
Apr. 3, 1990 Utah notifies Illinois of its felony warrant 
(R. 586). 
June 5, 1990 Defendant seeks counsel in the Utah circuit 
court case (case no. 891001462) (R. 248, 315, 
523, 599). 
July 25, 1990 Defendant is sentenced on the Illinois 
charges and receives credit for time served 
(R. 249, 321-23, 599). He is transferred to 
federal custody on July 31, 1990, pursuant to 
a federal felony warrant (R. 246, 249). 
4 
Aug. 2, 1990 
Aug. 9, 1990 
Mar. 15, 1991 
May 7, 1991 
May 13, 1991 
June 4, 1991 
June 26, 1991 
June 27, 1991 
July 7, 1991 
July 25, 1991 
July 31, 1991 
Utah notifies federal authorities of its 
felony warrant (R. 399524) . 
Defendant posts bail and is released from 
federal custody (R. 249, 401; Tr. 23-24). He 
returns to federal custody on Jan. 31, 1991 
(R. 249). 
Defendant files a motion to dismiss and seeks 
counsel in the Utah case previously dismissed 
on Nov. 6, 1989 (R% 249, 316-20, 341, 531, 
600). Addendum H. He renews his request for 
counsel on July 3, 1991 (R. 165). 
Defendant files a federal habeas corpus 
petition against the Utah authorities, none 
of whom receive service or appeared (R. 254 
-55, 274, 356-57, 366-67, 601; Tr. 23). The 
petition is denied on September 24, 1991 (R. 
255, 350-53) 
Defendant is sentenced in federal court on 
five counts of mail fraud (R. 249, 325-27) . 
Defendant is permanently incarcerated in the 
Sandstone Federal Correctional Institution in 
Sandstone, Minnesota (Sandstone) (R. 249, 
325-27) . Sandstone notifies Utah of 
defendant's presence on March 4, 1992 (R. 
328, 436) . 
Utah lodges an official detainer with the 
authorities at Sandstone (R. 250, 329, 602). 
However, defendant resists extradition (R. 
602) . 
Utah sends a formal request to Sandstone for 
temporary custody of defendant pursuant to 
Article IV of the IAD (R. 250, 330-31). 
Defendant notifies Utah authorities of his 
resistance to extradition (R. 250, 332). 
Defendant invokes the 30-day hold under 
Article IV(a), during which time he cannot be 
extradited (R. 250, 333-34, 602; Plaintiff's 
Exh. #1, last page). The period expires on 
Aug. 24, 1991 (R. 334, 602). 
Defendant notifies federal authorities that 
he intends to resist extradition to Utah (Tr. 
19-20; Plaintiff's Exh. #4). He repeats a 
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similar notice on Aug. 26, 1991 (Tr. 17 
-18; Plaintiff's Exh. #1, page 4), and 
refuses to sign the IAD forms (Tr. 18; 
Plaintiff's Exh. #1, page 5). 
Aug. 26, 1991 Sandstone offers Utah temporary custody of 
defendant under the IAD (R. 250, 335-36). 
Sept. 20, 1991 Sandstone notifies defendant of his right to 
file a request for disposition under the IAD 
and offers to complete the necessary 
paperwork (R. 251, 337). 
Sept. 26, 1991 Defendant notifies federal authorities that 
he still opposes extradition to Utah (R. 
251, 338) . 
Oct. 4, 1991 Defendant appeals the denial of his habeas 
petition to the Tenth Circuit (R. 255, 357-
63). On Nov. 13, he moves to withdraw his 
appeal (R. 255, 364), and the Tenth Circuit 
dismisses the appeal on Dec. 4, 1991, with no 
appearance made by Utah authorities (R. 255, 
365) . 
Dec. 16, 1991 Utah authorities advise Sandstone that they 
will proceed with extradition (R. 251, 339 
-41), and ultimately arrange for his transfer 
to Utah custody on February 19, 1992 (R. 251 
-52, 342-44) . 
Feb. 19, 1992 Defendant arrives in Utah (R. 252, 603). 
Counsel is appointed for him the following 
day (id.). 
Feb. 24, 1992 Defendant files a motion to dismiss in the 
circuit court (R. 214-34, 252, 604). The 
State responds with a motion to quash (R. 
252-53, 345-46, 604), and the circuit court 
grants the State's motion on Apr. 2, 1992 (R. 
253, 345-46, 604). 
Apr. 30, 1992 After defendant is bound over to the 
district court on April 27 (R. 253, 237), the 
State files a motion in the district court 
for immediate arraignment and trial setting 
(R. 209-10, 253, 348-49) . 
May 1, 1992 Defendant files a motion to dismiss in the 
district court (R. 211-34). The State 
responds on May 18 (R. 238-367) . 
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May 15, 1992 Following defendant's express waiver of his 
speedy trial time at the arraignment on May 
11 (R. 236, 605; Addendum C), the district 
court schedules the four-day jury trial to 
begin July 7, 1992 (R. 370).3 
June 5, 1992 Defendant files a motion requesting discovery 
(R. 372-73) and a motion for an extension of 
time to reply to the State's response to 
his motion to dismiss (R. 374-75). The State 
responds to the discovery motion on Aug. 11 
(R. 384-407). His extension is granted by 
order entered Aug. 24 (R. 451-52), and his 
response is filed Sept. 21 (R. 483-546). 
June 8, 1992 The district court vacates the trial setting 
after defendant requests a continuance of 
trial and expressly waives his speedy trial 
rights in open court (R. 3 76-77) . Addendum C. 
June 11, 1992 Defendant files a motion for appointment of 
counsel and a motion requesting discovery (R. 
409-24) . He also files a new federal habeas 
action. 
Aug. 2_, 19924 Defendant files a "Motion for 
I Declaration of Invalidity" and a motion to 
withhold determination of his motion to 
dismiss pending a decision on this new motion 
(R. 427-448). The State responds on Sept. 8 
(R. 464-82) . 
Oct. 5, 1992 Following an evidentiary hearing on Sept. 24 
(R. 551-56), the court enters a memorandum 
decision denying both motions (R. 568-73). 
Oct. 13, 1992 A pre-trial conference is held in which 
defendant expressly waives his speedy trial 
time for the third time (R. 579-80). 
Addendum C. Two days later, the court 
schedules the trial to begin October 26, 1992 
(R. 576). 
Oct. 19 & 20, 1992 A hearing is held in district court based on 
defendant's concerns about the October 26 
trial setting (R. 581-82). Defendant informs 
3
 This puts the trial setting beyond the 120-day period 
defendant asserts in his appellate brief. Br. of App. at 26. 
4The exact date on the record entry is illegible. 
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the court that he will file an interlocutory 
appeal and that his motions and the appeal 
should be addressed before trial; defendant 
opines that a setting on November 18 would 
fall within the 120-day period of Article IV 
(R. 581-83). Addendum D. 
Oct. 21, 1992 The district court reschedules the trial to 
begin on November 18, 1992 (R. 584). 
Oct. 26, 1992 Defendant files an interlocutory appeal with 
the Utah Supreme Court (R. 669). 
Oct. 29, 1992 The district court enters written findings 
and conclusions denying defendant's motion to 
dismiss and motion for declaration of 
invalidity (R. 591-611). Defendant objects 
to the findings and conclusions on Nov. 4 (R. 
612-14), and the court rules on the 
objections on November 5 (R. 673-77) . 
Amended findings and conclusions are entered 
on Nov. 9 (R. 685-704). 
Oct. 29, 1992 Defendant files two motions to suppress 
evidence (R. 615-58). 
Nov. 3, 1992 Defendant files a motion to sever the 
charges, which he amends two days later (R. 
659-65). The State responds to defendant's 
three motions on November 10 (R. 707-22) . 
Nov. 5, 1992 Defendant moves to stay the proceedings 
because he does not want to go to trial until 
the Utah Supreme Court has ruled on his 
issues (R. 669-70). The district court 
denies the motion on November 6 (R. 678). 
Nov. 9, 1992 Based on defendant's motion to continue the 
trial (a copy of which does not appear in the 
record), the judge, in open court, 
reschedules the three-day trial to start 
January 13, 1993 (R. 681-82) . A formal order 
is entered on November 23, reflecting 
defendant's waiver of his speedy trial rights 
(R. 734-37). Addendum C. 
Nov. 18, 1992 The court denies defendant's three motions 
following an evidentiary hearing (R. 730-32). 
Formal findings and conclusions are entered 
Nov. 24 (R. 738-45). The State files an 
amended information (R. 724-29, 732). 
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Nov. 20, 1992 The Utah Supreme Court denies defendant's 
interlocutory appeal (R. 733). A second 
order denying the appeal is entered Jan. 12, 
1993 (R. 803).5 
Nov. 30, 1992 Defendant files a pro se motion for new 
counsel (R. 746-52), to which the State 
responds on Dec. 9 (R. 753-76). Defendant 
replies on Dec. 14 (R. 777-84), and the court 
enters its memorandum decision denying the 
motion on Dec. 15 (R. 785-87). The formal 
findings and conclusions are entered Dec. 16 
(R. 797-800). 
Dec. 16, 1992 Defendant files a motion to reconsider the 
Dec. 15 decision on his motion for new 
counsel (R. 788-93). Although the State 
responds within three days (R. 795-96), the 
file reflects no final order from the court. 
Jan. 12, 1993 Following a Jan. 5 hearing on defendant's 
motion for appointment of co-counsel (a copy 
of which does not appear in the record), the 
district court appoints co-counsel (R. 801 
-02) . 
Jan. 13, 1993 The jury is selected, and the jurors are 
sworn (R. 804-08) . 
Jan. 14, 1993 A plea agreement is presented to and accepted 
by the court, and the jury is dismissed (R. 
811). Addendum E. The agreement is signed 
(R. 847-63), and a second amended 
information is filed pursuant to the 
agreement (R. 843-46) . 
Jan. 20, 1993 Judgment and sentence is entered by the 
district court (R. 863-66) . 
Feb. 5, 1993 Defendant files a motion seeking credit for 
time served (R. 868071), and is released to 
federal authorities (unnumbered sheet between 
R. 875 and 876). 
5
 In a telephone conversation with the Utah Supreme Court 
clerk, the State has learned that both orders denying defendant's 
interlocutory appeal stem from the same appeal. The first order 
was issued after defendant filed his initial petition. Defendant 
later filed a supplement to his petition, after which the supreme 
court issued a second order in the same case denying the appeal. 
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Feb. 8, 1993 Defendant files a motion to withdraw his 
guilty pleas and renews his motion to dismiss 
the charges (R. 872-75). Addendum F. The 
State responds on Feb. 10 (R. 877-79), and 
the district court enters its findings and 
conclusions denying the motion on Feb. 11 (R. 
880-83). Thereafter, defendant files an 
affidavit reply (R. 884-86), and the court, 
after reconsidering the motion, denies it on 
April 29 (unnumbered findings and conclusions 
filed after R. 900). Addendum G. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
By information dated December 21, 1989, Defendant Jack 
D. Brocksmith was charged with eleven counts of theft by 
deception--one first degree felony, nine second degree felonies, 
and one third degree felony--in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-405 (1990), and four counts of communications fraud--one first 
degree felony and three second degree felonies--in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1990) (R. 1-8). Generally, the 
charges arose from several incidents in which defendant, while 
purporting to represent different insurance companies, obtained 
money from several people and knowingly failed to tell them that 
the money would be used for purposes other than purchasing life 
insurance policies (R. 12-24, 849-54). These incidents occurred 
between March 1988 and June 1989 (R. 1-8). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant seeks a remand of this matter to the district 
court for withdrawal of his guilty pleas and dismissal of the 
Utah charges with prejudice. He bases his right to relief on: 
1) the State's alleged violation of his statutory speedy trial 
rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act; 2) the 
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State's alleged violation of his constitutional speedy trial 
rights under both the federal and the state constitutions; and 3) 
the State's alleged violation of several procedural laws as well 
as the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
However, there are several reasons why this Court should not 
reach the merits of any of defendant's allegations. 
Despite defendant's bald assertion that he challenges 
the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty 
pleas, Br. of App. at ii, 2, 12, 27, 32, his brief does not 
contain any citation to the standard of review or legal authority 
relevant to appellate review of the trial court's ruling. 
Neither does defendant challenge the entry of his plea. Instead, 
the arguments in his brief involve alleged pre-plea violations, 
none of which were asserted below as a basis for withdrawing the 
plea. 
Two of the alleged statutory speedy trial violations in 
defendant's first argument were never raised below. The 
remaining allegation of a statutory violation was reviewed and 
denied by the trial court prior to entry of the guilty plea and 
was waived by: 1) defendant's four express waivers given in open 
court; 2) defendant's plea agreement and unconditional guilty 
pleas; and 3) defendant's resistance of extradition and 
subsequent dilatory tactics. Defendant waived his constitutional 
speedy trial argument by entering his guilty pleas and by failing 
to raise the claims in support of his motion to withdraw his 
pleas. Finally, defendant waived the due process and equal 
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protection violations he asserts in his third argument by 
entering his guilty pleas, and he raises them for the first time 
on appeal without an assertion of plain error or exceptional 
circumstances. Accordingly, this Court need not address the 
merits of defendant's arguments on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT ADDRESS THE MERITS OF THE IAD 
ISSUES RAISED BY DEFENDANT BECAUSE HE HAS AFFIRMATIVELY 
WAIVED THEM 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas based on the 
State's alleged pre-plea violation of his statutory speedy trial 
rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), 
specifically, the State's failure to: 1) commence trial within 
the 180-day period provided by Article III; 2) commence trial 
within the 120-day period provided by Article IV; and 3) timely 
transport defendant to Utah under Articles IV and V.6 Br. of 
6
 This Court may refuse to reach the merits of all of 
defendant's appellate arguments because defendant's brief violates 
rule 24(a)(5), (7), (8), (9), and 24(e), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, by: 1) providing no relevant legal authority or 
argument for his repeated assertion that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas; 2) providing no 
standard of review for any of his arguments; 3) labeling his 
conclusion as a summary of arguments and omitting a true summary; 
and 4) providing insufficient record citations throughout his 
brief--one citation in his first argument, none in his second, one 
in his third, and only a handful in his ten-page statement of the 
case--despite the fact that the issues he raises are fact-
intensive, the court's record consists of over 900 pages spanning 
5 volumes (exclusive of three envelopes) and has no index, and 
numerous relevant documents were filed in a case which is not 
included in the current record, making those documents available, 
if at all, only as attachments to various memoranda scattered 
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App. at 12-27. Defendant's argument, in light of the facts of 
this case, requires this Court to initially determine whether the 
statutory speedy trial rights under the IAD are waivable. If 
they can be waived, defendant has waived them by his own actions. 
If they cannot be waived, this Court must address the merits of 
defendant's claim that the State's alleged violations entitle him 
to dismissal of his charges. 
A. A Prisoner May Waive His Rights Under The IAD 
There is a split in the authorities which have 
addressed this issue. A minority of courts have found that, in 
limited circumstances, rights under the IAD may not be waived. 
See, e.g., People v. Brooks, 189 Cal.App.3d 866, 234 Cal.Rptr. 
573, 575 (4 Dist. 1987) ("As a general rule a guilty plea does 
not constitute a waiver of a violation of the [IAD] properly 
asserted before the plea is entered."); Gibson v. Klevenhagen, 
777 F.2d 1056, 1058-59 (Tex. 1985) (relying on a separate state 
statute relating to appeals from guilty pleas, the court held 
that a guilty plea does not waive IAD violations which were 
raised prior to entry of the plea). However, a majority of the 
courts addressing the issue have found to the contrary. 
throughout the record. See State v. Yates. 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah 
App. 1992) (declining to reach an inadequately-briefed argument); 
State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 250 (Utah App. 1992) (finding 
appellant's brief deficient, in part, because it failed to set 
forth the appropriate standard of review with supporting authority 
for each issue, and the purported issues did not correlate with the 
body of the arguments); Christensen v. Munns. 812 P.2d 69, 73 (Utah 
App. 1991) (finding a brief in violation of the rule, in part, 
because it ignored the standard of review requirement). 
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Speaking to various aspects of both Article III and 
Article IV, a majority of jurisdictions has found that the IAD 
generally affords prisoners a statutory protection, not a 
fundamental or constitutional right. Yellen v. Cooper. 828 F.2d 
1471, 1474 (10th Cir. 1987); Greathouse v. United States. 655 
F.2d 1032, 1034 (10th Cir. 1981), cert, denied 455 U.S. 926, 102 
S. Ct. 1289 (1982); see also Webb v. Keohane, 804 F.2d 413, 414-
15 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Lawson, 736 F.2d 835, 838-39 
(2nd Cir. 1984); United States v. Black, 609 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th 
Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 847, 101 S. Ct. 132 (1980). 
The protections afforded by the IAD are nonjurisdictional, State 
v. Carter, 729 P.2d 336, 338 (Az. App. 1986); People v. Crossen, 
485 N.Y.S.2d 189, 191 (N.Y. Sup. 1985), and may be waived by a 
prisoner. Yellen, 828 F.2d at 1474; Gray v. Benson, 608 F.2d 
825, 827 (10th Cir. 1979) ; see also United States v. Oldaker, 823 
F.2d 778, 781 (4th Cir. 1987) (Article IV is not jurisdictional 
and can be waived per United States v. Odom, 674 F.2d 228, 23 0 
(4th Cir), cert, denied, 457 U.S. 1125 (1982)); Kowalak v. United 
States, 645 F.2d 534, 537 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. 
Palmer, 574 F.2d 164, 167 (3d Cir.) (Article IV(e)), cert, 
denied, 437 U.S. 907 (1978); United States v. Tummolo, 822 
F.Supp. 1561, 1564 n.5 (S.D. Fla. 1993); People v. Nitz, 219 
Cal.App.3d 164, 268 Cal.Rptr. 54, 57 (1990). The waiver need not 
be "knowing and intelligent," but must be voluntary. Gray, 608 
F.2d at 826-27; see also Lawson, 736 F.2d at 838-39; Odom, 674 
F.2d at 230; People v. Brown, 854 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Colo. App. 
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1992); People v. Jones, 495 N.W.2d 159, 160 (Mich. App. 1992), 
appeal denied, 503 N.W.2d 902 (1993). The general rationale is 
that the rights arising under the IAD are not of such fundamental 
importance as to preclude their voluntary waiver. See Kowalak, 
645 F.2d at 537; Palmer, 574 F.2d at 167; Carter, 729 P.2d at 
338. 
Waiver occurs through an inmate's own actions, Amicrer 
v. Long, 474 N.Y.S.2d 852, 854 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept. 1984); People v. 
Torres, 456 N.E.2d 497, 499-500 (N.Y. 1983), and generally 
accompanies a prisoner's request for or acquiescence in treatment 
in a manner contrary to IAD protections. Yellen, 828 F.2d at 
1474 (signing a transfer request signals a waiver of IAD rights); 
Gray, 608 F.2d at 827 (requesting a transfer away from the 
charging jurisdiction before trial essentially seeks treatment 
contrary to the IAD); see also Keohane, 804 F.2d at 414 
(requesting a transfer from the charging jurisdiction waives IAD 
rights); Kowalak, 645 F.2d at 537 (pleading guilty and standing 
trial both seek treatment contrary to the IAD). 
B. Defendant Waived His Statutory Speedy Trial Rights Under The 
IAD 
1. Defendant Expressly Waived His Rights In Open Court 
On Four Occasions 
After being extradited to Utah, defendant expressly 
waived his statutory speedy trial rights under the IAD four times 
in open court while represented by counsel. Defendant's first 
waiver occurred during his arraignment in district court on May 
11, 1992. After the State requested a trial setting, defendant 
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waived his time for a speedy trial (R. 235-36; Addendum C), and 
the trial court scheduled the trial to begin on July 7 (R. 370)--
beyond both the 180- and the 120-day limits defendant claims in 
his brief.7 Br. of App. at 21, 26. 
Defendant's second waiver occurred on June 8, 1992. 
Defendant sought from the court an extension of time to 
supplement his motion to dismiss and expressly waived his speedy 
trial time (R. 376-77) . Addendum C. As a result, the district 
court vacated the trial setting and scheduled another motion 
hearing (R. 377). 
Defendant announced his third express waiver at the 
pre-trial conference on October 13, 1992. Defendant informed the 
court that he intended to file an interlocutory appeal and 
additional motions, then expressly waived his speedy trial time 
(R. 579-80) . Addendum C. The court then rescheduled the trial 
from October to November (R. 584). 
Finally, defendant moved to continue the November trial 
setting and, at a review hearing on November 9, 1992, "knowingly 
and voluntarily in open court . . . waived his right to a speedy 
trial and to the commencement of trial" within the time allowed 
under the IAD (R. 681-82, 734-37). Addendum C. The final waiver 
was reduced to a written order signed by the trial judge (R. 734-
7
 Defendant has not challenged the voluntary nature of any of 
his express waivers, and this Court should presume that the waivers 
encompassed both his constitutional and his statutory speedy trial 
rights where there is nothing in the record to the contrary. State 
v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 788 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 
327 (Utah 1991) . 
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37). Addendum C. The district court granted defendant's motion 
and rescheduled the trial to begin on January 13, 1993 (R. 705). 
Addendum C. 
The record clearly reflects that the district court 
scheduled trial dates only after receiving express waivers from 
defendant of his speedy trial time. Granting defendant relief on 
appeal based on the delay in trying the charges would sanction 
invited error as he led the court to rely on his waivers in 
setting and repeatedly continuing the trial setting. See State 
v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App. 1992) (noting that to 
allow a claim of plain error where counsel failed to raise his 
juror challenge below would sanction invited error); State v. 
Smith, 776 P.2d 929, 932 (Utah App. 1989) (a defendant cannot 
lead the court into error then later profit by his actions). The 
multiple express waivers, relied upon by the prosecutor and the 
trial court, should bind defendant, see People v. Jones, 4 95 
N.W.2d 159, 161 (Mich. App. 1992) (a defendant's request for or 
express agreement with a trial setting outside the IAD timeframe 
waives his IAD rights), appeal denied, 503 N.W.2d 902 (1993); 
People v. Nitz, 219 Cal.App.3d 164, 268 Cal.Rptr. 54, 57 (1990) 
(express waivers are deemed effective even if the IAD speedy 
trial period has run prior to the time the waiver is given), and 
this Court should refuse to review the merits of his IAD claims 
on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359-60 (Utah 
App. 1993) . 
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2. Defendant Voluntarily Waived His Rights By Entering 
Unconditional Guilty Pleas 
Entry of a valid guilty plea waives the right to assert 
violations of the IAD. See Baxter v. United States, 966 F.2d 
387, 389 (8th Cir. 1992); Beachem v. Attorney General of 
Missouri, 808 F.2d 1303, 1304 (8th Cir. 1987); Kowalak v. United 
States, 645 F.2d 534, 537 (6th Cir. 1981); State v. Carter, 729 
P.2d 336, 338 (Az. App. 1986); Sherman v. State, 693 P.2d 1071, 
1072 (Id. App. 1984); State v. Ternaku, 383 A.2d 437, 439 (N.J. 
App. 1978); People v. Cusick, 489 N.Y.S.2d 96, 97 (N.Y.A.D. 2 
Dept. 1985); Knox v. State, 848 P.2d 1354, 1358 (Wyo. 1993) (only 
by conditioning his guilty plea on his right to appeal IAD and 
speedy trial issues did defendant preserve these issues for 
appellate review); see generally State v. Smith, 833 P.2d 371, 
372 (Utah App. 1992) (a voluntary plea of guilty waives the right 
to appeal all nonjurisdictional issues); State ex rel. E.G.T., 
808 P.2d 138, 139 (Utah App. 1991). This is so even if the time 
provisions of the IAD had been violated prior to the entry of the 
plea. Nitz, 268 Cal.Rptr. at 57. 
All of the guilty pleas entered on January 14, 1993, 
are unconditional, and defendant does not challenge their 
validity on appeal. Defendant executed a plea agreement which 
expressed his intent to waive the IAD claims by entering his 
unconditional pleas. The agreement provides that the pleas waive 
"any issue for appeal relative to the Court's rulings on pre-
trial motions or based upon statutory or constitutional 
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challenges" (R. 856) .8 Addendum E. Hence, defendant's guilty 
pleas waived the IAD claims he seeks to raise on appeal.9 
3. Defendant Waived His Claim of IAD Violations By 
Resisting Extradition And Engaging In Dilatory Tactics 
Defendant's active resistance to the efforts of Utah 
authorities to extradite him and his delaying tactics thereafter 
waive any right to assert IAD violations. See United States v. 
Oldaker, 823 F.2d 778, 780-81 (4th Cir. 1987) (unexpected and 
8
 The plea agreement states, in relevant part: 
j. I understand that by pleading guilty I am 
waiving my statutory and constitutional rights to file an 
appeal. 
k. I know that by entering pleas of guilty, I am 
admitting and do so admit, that I have committed the 
conduct alleged and that I am guilty of the crimes for 
which my pleas are entered. I further understand that I 
am pleading guilty unconditionally and that I am not 
preserving any issue for appeal relative to the Court's 
rulings on pre-trial motions or based upon statutory or 
constitutional challenges in this case. 
(R. 856). Addendum E. 
9
 Further, this Court should not review the trial court's 
ruling on defendant's motion to withdraw the pleas because 
defendant does not present any relevant legal authority or argument 
supporting his claim that the trial court's ruling constituted 
error, Br. of App. at 12, 27, and defendant did not present the 
alleged IAD violations to the trial court as a basis to withdraw 
his pleas. His pro se motion to withdraw his guilty pleas was 
based solely on his claim that the State failed to expeditiously 
return him to federal custody after sentencing on the Utah charges, 
in violation of the plea agreement and Article IV(e) and (h) of the 
IAD; he does not raise this argument on appeal (R. 873-74) . 
Addendum F. Although the motion resurrected defendant's motion to 
dismiss, it did not urge the pre-plea claims as a basis for 
withdrawing his pleas, nor did the trial court interpret them in 
that manner (unnumbered order filed Apr. 29, 1993). Addendum F 
and G. Accordingly, this Court need not address the trial court's 
ruling on defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas. State v. 
Hodson, 866 P.2d 556, 559 (Utah App. 1993); Brown, 856 P.2d at 359-
60; State v. Brooks, 225 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 19 (Utah App. 1993). 
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unjustified withdrawal of plea contrary to plea agreement invited 
delay and precluded relief); United States v. Boggs, 612 F.2d 
991, 993 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 857, 101 S. Ct. 156 
(1980) (a prisoner "cannot by his own action manufacture a 
violation of the (IAD) and then seek relief under it."); 
Commonwealth v. Fasano. 375 N.E.2d 361, 366 (Mass. App. 1978) 
(defendant's untimely filing of a defense motion waived part of 
the IAD time period). Cf. People v. Cranmer, 389 N.Y.S.2d 905, 
906 (App. Div. 3 Dept. 1976) (defendant's own conduct in having 
trial postponed because he intended to plead guilty, then 
changing his mind about his plea, was the cause of his failure to 
be timely tried and constituted a waiver of his rights under the 
IAD) . 
A prisoner's Article III request constitutes a waiver 
of extradition to the charging state. IAD, Art. 111(e). The 
record shows that defendant continually resisted extradition to 
Utah following his incarceration in the Sandstone facility on 
June 4, 1991, despite his assertion on appeal that the 180-day 
period under Article III began on June 4 (R. 250, 332-34, 338, 
357-63; Tr. 17-20). Br. of App. at 17. Those efforts constitute 
an affirmative decision by defendant to be treated in a manner 
contrary to the protections of Article III. Accordingly, his 
actions waived his Article III protections. See Yellen v. 
Cooper, 828 F.2d 1471, 1474 (10th Cir. 1987); Gray v. Benson. 608 
F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 1979). 
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Moreover, after inhibiting his return to Utah, 
defendant was responsible for delaying his trial as well. From 
the time he arrived in Utah until the time he entered his pleas, 
defendant filed no less than 17 motions, objections, replies and 
extension requests, plus an interlocutory appeal and a federal 
habeas action, most of which involve identical IAD issues. The 
trial was originally set then rescheduled four times all based on 
defendant's express waivers of his speedy trial rights in open 
court (Addendum C), and on his written acknowledgement that the 
120-day period of Article IV would not be violated. Addendum C. 
Defendant took the position before the court that rulings on his 
motions and miscellaneous filings were required before trial 
could occur (R. 427-48, 581-82, 669-70, 735-37). Defendant's 
actions clearly accounted for the delay in his trial and 
demonstrate, without question, that defendant had abandoned any 
interest in receiving a speedy disposition of the Utah charges in 
accordance with the purpose of the IAD. See Point 11(A), infra. 
On the other hand, the State made every attempt to 
expedite trial on the Utah charges by maintaining contact with 
Illinois and federal authorities to ascertain defendant's 
availability under the IAD (R. 297-98, 310-11, 333-34, 339-43, 
344, 401-02), lodging a detainer and seeking defendant's 
extradition to Utah under Article IV within two weeks of 
defendant's incarceration in Sandstone (R. 329-31), obtaining his 
presence in Utah as soon as practicable given defendant's 
resistance, and formally seeking an immediate arraignment and 
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trial setting once defendant was bound over to district court (R. 
209-10). Given the State's good-faith efforts to expedite the 
trial, defendant's numerous, repetitive filings and affirmative 
efforts to resist extradition--all of which had the foreseeable 
effect of delaying Utah's ability to try him in 180 days--waive 
his right to assert IAD violations. See Oldaker, 823 F.2d at 
780-81. 
4. Additionally, Defendant Waived His Claims Under 
Articles IV And V By Failing To Raise Them Below 
The provisions of Articles IV and V were additionally 
waived by defendant's failure to raise either issue below. 
Defendant never presented to the trial court any allegation 
either that the State violated the 120-day period of Article IV 
or that the State violated Article V by failing to timely 
transport him to Utah after August 26, 1991. Because defendant 
raises these issues for the first time on appeal and presents no 
claim of plain error or exceptional circumstances, this Court 
should not address the merits of either claim. State v. 
Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 705 n.2 (Utah App. 1993); State v. 
Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 917-18 (Utah App. 1992). 
POINT II 
SHOULD THIS COURT REACH THE MERITS OF DEFENDANT'S IAD 
CLAIMS, IT WILL FIND NO IAD VIOLATION BECAUSE DEFENDANT 
NEVER ACTIVATED ARTICLE III, TRIAL BEGAN WITHIN THE 
PERIODS REQUIRED BY ARTICLES III AND IV, AND DISMISSAL 
IS NOT WARRANTED FOR A DELAY IN EXTRADITING DEFENDANT 
UNDER ARTICLE IV WHERE DEFENDANT RESISTED EXTRADITION 
Because of the lack of Utah authority directly on 
point, the split in authority concerning waiver of IAD 
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protections, and the fact that the various jurisdictions 
interpreting the IAD do not do so uniformly, the State addresses 
in this Point the merits of defendant's arguments found at Point 
I (A)-(C) in Appellant's Brief.10 However, the State does not 
concede that this Court should reach the merits of defendant's 
IAD claims. 
A. Introduction: Overview of Relevant IAD Provisions 
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act is an 
interstate compact governed by federal law under Article 1, 
Section 10, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution. Cuyler 
v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438-42 (1981). Utah's version is 
identical to that adopted by the District of Columbia, the United 
States, and forty-seven other states. Crosland v. State, 857 
P.2d 943, 945 (Utah 1993). The IAD's purpose is to "'encourage 
the expeditious and orderly disposition of . .. charges 
[outstanding against a prisoner] and determination of the proper 
status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, 
informations, or complaints.'" Crosland, 857 P.2d at 945 
(quoting United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 343 (1978) and 
Article I of the IAD). The statute protects not only the rights 
of prisoners to a speedy trial, but also the interests of the 
party states. Crosland, 857 P.2d at 945; State v. Stilling, 770 
P.2d 137, 140 (Utah 1989). 
10
 For a discussion of the non-uniform results reached by the 
various jurisdictions under the IAD, see Zupanec, D. M., Validity, 
Construction, and Application of Interstate Agreement on Detainers, 
98 A.L.R.3d 160 (1980). 
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Once a signatory state [charging state] files a 
detainer against a person incarcerated in another signatory state 
[custodial state], the protections of the Act may be activated by 
either the prisoner or the charging state. IAD, Art. Ill(a) and 
IV(a); Addendum A; Crosland, 857 P.2d at 945; Stilling, 770 P.2d 
at 140. When the custodial officials notify the prisoner of the 
detainer, the prisoner may invoke the protections of Article III 
by submitting to the custodial authorities a written request for 
disposition of the charges underlying the detainer. IAD, Art. 
Ill (a) and (c); Crosland, 857 P.2d at 945." By making the 
request, a prisoner waives extradition to the charging state for 
the purpose of trial on the outstanding charges and waives 
extradition back to the charging state to serve any term of 
imprisonment imposed there after his term in the custodial state 
expires. IAD, Art. 111(e). Upon receipt of a proper request, 
the custodial official must forward the request to the 
"appropriate court" and the prosecuting attorney in the charging 
state together with an offer to provide temporary custody of the 
prisoner and with certain other specific information identified 
in the statute. IAD, Art. Ill(a) and (d); Crosland, 857 P.2d at 
945. The charging state authorities must then bring the prisoner 
11
 Some states allow a prisoner to bypass the custodial 
authorities but may hold him to a higher standard of compliance 
with the IAD. See, e.g., McCallum v. State, 407 So.2d 865, 869 
(Ala. Crim. App. 1981); Commonwealth v. Martens, 500 N.E.2d 282, 
286 n.2 (Mass. 1986), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1041, 107 S. Ct. 1982 
(1987); State v. Tarango, 734 P.2d 1275, 1279 (N.M. App. 1987), 
overruled on other grounds by Zurla v. State, 789 P.2d 588 (N.M. 
1990) (and cases cited therein). 
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to trial on the charges within 180 days of their receipt of valid 
written notice. IAD, Art. Ill(a); Crosland, 857 P.2d at 945-46; 
see also Fex v. Michigan, U.S. , 113 S. Ct. 1085, 1091 
(1993) . 
If the charging state authorities wish to activate the 
provisions of the IAD after filing a detainer, they may request 
temporary custody of the prisoner from the custodial state. IAD, 
Art. IV(a); Stilling, 770 P.2d at 140. The states must exchange 
certain information, and either the prisoner or the governor of 
the custodial state may request 3 0 days in which the governor may 
review the request for temporary custody. IAD, Art. IV(a) and 
Art. V. Should the prisoner be extradited to the charging state, 
trial must be had within 120 days of his arrival in the state. 
IAD, Art. IV(c). 
The time periods specified in the IAD may be tolled or 
continued under certain circumstances. IAD, Art. Ill (a), Art. 
IV(c), Art. VI; see subsection (B)(2), infra. 
B. The State Did Not Violate The Speedy Trial Provisions Of 
Article III of the IAD 
1. Defendant Never Invoked His Article III Protections 
Article III outlines several procedural factors which 
must be met before the protections of the article are activated. 
Specifically, it provides: 
(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of 
imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of 
a party state, and whenever during the continuance of 
the term of imprisonment there is pending in anv other 
party state any untried indictment, information or 
complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been 
lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to 
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trial within 180 days after he shall have caused to be 
delivered to the prosecuting officer and the 
appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's 
jurisdiction written notice of the place of his 
imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to 
be made of the indictment, information or complaint; 
provided that for good cause shown in open court, the 
prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having 
jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or 
reasonable continuance. The request of the prisoner 
shall be accompanied by a certificate of the 
appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, 
stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner 
is being held, the time already served, the time 
remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of 
good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the 
prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency 
relating to the prisoner. 
(Emphasis added.) Addendum A. Defendant contends that when he 
filed his written request for disposition under Article III on 
February 7, 1990, there were untried charges outstanding against 
him in Utah and the Utah authorities had filed a detainer with 
Sandstone (a copy of the request is attached in Addendum B). Br. 
of App. at 16-17. He argues that once he was incarcerated at the 
Sandstone facility on June 4, 1991, he had complied with the last 
of the procedural requirements of Article III, albeit not in the 
order stated in the statute, and was entitled to be tried on the 
Utah charges within 180 days of that date.12 Id. at 15-22. He 
12
 Defendant briefly references the fact that he "has 
previously argued" that Article III was triggered before his 
incarceration at Sandstone in June 1991. Br. of App. at 21. 
However, his brief reference to previous arguments is devoid of 
record or legal authority or citation, is both cursory and 
speculative, and is entirely insufficient to put the previous 
arguments before this Court for appellate review. Moreover, he 
expressly "put [s] those arguments aside" and concedes that the only 
trigger to the Article III protections which he asserts on appeal 
is the June 1991 date of his incarceration at the Sandstone 
facility. Id. at 17, 21-22. Accordingly, the State does not 
address the "previous" arguments in this brief. 
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argues that the State's failure to bring him to trial before 
December 3, 1991, regardless of the order in which the Article 
III prerequisites were accomplished, constitutes a violation of 
Article III and entitles him to withdrawal of his guilty pleas 
and dismissal of the Utah charges. Id. However, defendant's 
argument necessarily fails because he never activated the 
protections of Article III. 
Contrary to defendant's assertion, the order in which 
the procedural prerequisites of Article III are accomplished is 
important to the application of the IAD's protections. A 
prisoner cannot take steps to invoke his IAD rights until a 
detainer has been lodged with the custodial state. IAD, Art. 
Ill(a); Crosland v. State, 857 P.2d 943, 945 (Utah 1993); State 
v. Martin, 765 P.2d 854, 856 (Utah 1988); s^e also United States 
v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 343-34 (1978); State v. Ferdinando, 260 
S.E.2d 423, 426 (N.C. 1979). Further, it is not a prisoner's 
incarceration which triggers the 180-day period under Article 
III, but rather the charging state's receipt of the prisoner's 
written notice. Fex v. Michigan, U.S. , 113 S. Ct. 1085, 
1090-91 (1993) (the receiving state's prosecutors should not bear 
the "risk of losing their case until they have been informed of 
the request for trial." (emphasis in original)); Crosland, 857 
P.2d at 946 ("180-day period could not have begun until Utah 
authorities actually received [defendant's] request and received 
notice that there was a valid request for trial"); State v. 
Stilling, 770 P.2d 137, 140 (Utah 1989); Martin, 765 P.2d at 856. 
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This necessarily requires that all other prerequisites stated in 
Article III are fulfilled prior to delivery of the written notice 
to the receiving state: time cannot commence against the 
charging state if, when it receives defendant's written notice, 
it has to wait for defendant to commence the required "term of 
imprisonment." 
In this case, the order in which defendant claims to 
have fulfilled the Article III prerequisites did not activate his 
IAD protections because at the time he filed his written request 
for disposition on February 7, 1990, the IAD was not applicable 
to him, rendering his request premature and ineffective. A 
prisoner's attempts to invoke the protections of the IAD are 
ineffective unless the IAD is applicable to him. See, e.g., 
Henaaer v. State, 716 P.2d 669, 672-73 (Okla. Cr. 1986) (a 
written request filed before a detainer is lodged is of no effect 
and does not become effective when a detainer is lodged 
thereafter), overruled on other grounds by Cooper v. State, 810 
P.2d 1303 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991); Crosland, 857 P.2d at 945-46 
(a pre-detainer request was found to be "defective" and was given 
no effect after a detainer was lodged). The IAD does not apply 
to pre-trial detainees or to prisoners released from custody. 
United States v. Wilson, 719 F.2d 1491, 1494-95 (10th Cir. 1983) 
(the IAD does not apply to a prisoner who is awaiting trial or 
sentencing); see also United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628, 632-33 
(7th Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1068, 108 S. Ct. 1033 
(1988); State v. Butler, 496 So.2d 916, 917-18 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. 
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1986); Hickev v. State, 349 N.W.2d 772, 778 (Iowa App. 1984) (a 
prisoner is a pre-trial detainee before his "term of 
imprisonment" begins, and the IAD does not apply to him); State 
v. Julian, 765 P.2d 1104, 1105-06 (Kan. 1988). Moreover, release 
from custody terminates the IAD's application. See State v. 
Bellino, 557 A.2d 963, 964 (Me. 1989) (the IAD does not apply to 
a paroled prisoner); State v. Holley, 571 A.2d 892, 895-97 (Md. 
App. 1990) (the IAD did not continue in effect after defendant's 
term of imprisonment in another state ended); State v. Taranao, 
734 P.2d 1275, 1278-79 (N.M. App. 1987) (once a prisoner was 
released, his rights regarding speedy trial were the same as 
those of any other individual), overruled on other grounds by 
Zurla v. State, 789 P.2d 588 (N.M. 1990); State v. Thompson, 483 
N.E.2d 1207, 1210 (Ohio App. 1984) (the IAD became inapplicable 
when defendant was released from imprisonment by the custodial 
state). The reasoning has been clearly stated: 
[T]he Agreement is only concerned that a sentenced 
prisoner who has entered into the life of an 
institution to which he has been committed for a term 
of imprisonment not have programs of treatment and 
rehabilitation obstructed by numerous absences in 
connection with successive proceedings related to 
pending charges in another jurisdiction. There is no 
indication in the language of the Agreement or in the 
legislative history that its provisions were intended 
to apply to persons being detained for trial who are 
not serving prison sentences . . . . 
United States v. Roberts, 548 F.2d 665, 670-71 (6th Cir. 1977) . 
Attempts to comply with Article III prerequisites before the IAD 
is applicable are not later rendered effective merely because the 
IAD eventually becomes applicable. See generally United States 
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v. Hall, 974 F.2d 1201, 1203-05 (9th Cir. 1992) (a request sent 
before charges are outstanding does not trigger IAD protections 
when it is sent or once charges are later filed); United States 
v. Sanders, 669 F.2d 609, 610-11 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 456 
U.S. 964, 102 S. Ct. 2044 (1982); United States v. Henson, 945 
F.2d 430, 434-36 (1st Cir. 1991); People v. Garner, 224 
Cal.App.3d 1363, 274 Cal.Rptr. 298, 301-02 (1990) (a detainer 
lodged while defendant was a pre-trial detainee was ineffective 
and did not follow defendant to prison after his conviction); 
Commonwealth v. Llovd, 535 A.2d 1152, 1158-60 (Pa. Super.) 
(written disposition requests sent before defendant began his 
term of imprisonment did not trigger Article III time limits), 
appeal denied. 542 A.2d 1367 (1988) . Accordingly, once the IAD 
becomes applicable, a defendant is obligated to comply with all 
the requirements of Article III in order to invoke its 
protections. See Martins, 765 P.2d at 857 (a prisoner must 
comply with all the requirements of the IAD before he invokes the 
protections of Article III); see also Newcomb v. State, 779 P.2d 
1240, 1244 (Alaska App. 1989). 
Defendant was a pre-trial detainee from the time he was 
transferred from Utah to Illinois on November 6, 1989, until his 
July 25, 1990, sentencing on the Illinois charges (R. 321-23); 
his request for disposition was completed during this period. At 
sentencing, defendant was released, subject to holds from other 
jurisdictions (id.). He was then transferred to federal custody 
and, on August 9, 1990, he posted bail and was released pending 
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trial on the federal charges (R. 246, 249; Tr. 23-24). When he 
was later returned to federal custody on January 31, 1991, 
defendant again assumed the position of a pre-trial detainee, 
thus continuing his ineligibility for IAD protections until he 
was sentenced on May 13, 1991, and incarcerated at the federal 
facility on June 4, 1991 (R. 249-50, 325-27, 402).13 
Consequently, the IAD did not apply to defendant at the time he 
wrote his February 7, 1990, request for disposition, and 
defendant was required to comply with all of the Article III 
prerequisites after the IAD became applicable in 1991. 
Utah charges were outstanding when defendant was 
imprisoned at Sandstone. Utah lodged a detainer with the 
Sandstone authorities on June 26, 1991 (R. 250, 329), and 
defendant was informed of the detainer on or before July 7, 1991 
(R. 332) . At that point, the only prerequisite remaining under 
Article III was a valid written request for disposition. 
However, defendant failed to file any requests after his 
premature and ineffective letter of February 7, 1990, despite 
notice from both Sandstone and Utah authorities that the February 
letter was premature, and despite notice from Sandstone 
authorities that a request was required and that they would 
13
 Both the Utah and the Illinois authorities recognized that 
the February 1990 request was premature (R. 247-48, 309-11, 598; 
Tr. 4-5) . Once the IAD became applicable to defendant--after his 
federal sentencing and incarceration--the Utah authorities lodged 
a formal detainer against defendant, allowing him to invoke his IAD 
protections (R. 250, 329). 
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complete the necessary paperwork if he wished to proceed under 
the IAD (R. 337; Tr. 18-19, 22).14 
Quoting from the United States Supreme Court's decision 
of United States v. Mauro. 436 U.S. 340, 98 S. Ct. 1834 (1977), 
defendant contends that his motion to dismiss, filed March 15, 
1991, could constitute a valid request for final disposition of 
the Utah charges (a copy of the motion is attached in Addendum 
H). Br. of App. at 14. He contends that the motion put "the 
Court and the State . . . on notice that the Defendant was 
requesting speedy disposition of all Utah charges." Id. at 15. 
However, the motion cannot serve as de facto notice 
under Article III that defendant was pursuing disposition of the 
Utah charges for several reasons. First, the motion was filed 
while defendant was in federal custody awaiting sentencing on the 
federal charges (R. 249, 325-27). Accordingly, defendant was a 
pre-trial detainee, and the IAD did not apply to him at the time 
he filed the motion to dismiss. Wilson, 719 F.2d at 1494-95. 
Second, the motion was not filed in "the appropriate 
court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction" as required by 
Article III. IAD, Art. Ill(a); Martin, 765 P.2d at 856 
(communication solely to the prosecutor is insufficient 
compliance with Article Ill's requirement of written notice to 
both the prosecutor and the appropriate court). Defendant filed 
the motion in the First Judicial District Court in Cache County 
14
 Defendant's letter of July 7, 1991, expressly states, "this 
is "NOT" a request for final disposition" (R. 332). 
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in case number 891001140. Addendum H. However, those charges 
had been dismissed on November 6, 1989, with the knowledge and 
acquiescence of defendant's attorney (R. 244, 304). At the time 
defendant filed his motion to dismiss, the only Utah charges 
against him were pending in the First Circuit Court in case 
number 891001462 (R. 246-47, 306-07, 340, 596-97). Defendant was 
aware of the proper court and case number as he included both on 
the letter he sent to the circuit court on June 5, 1990, seeking 
appointment of counsel in the case (R. 523). Hence, the motion 
did not constitute effective notice under Article III. Martin, 
765 P.2d at 856. 
Third, the motion did not put the Utah authorities on 
notice that defendant intended to seek disposition of the Utah 
charges. A motion to dismiss is not a request for trial; it 
indicates that defendant seeks dismissal of the charges, not 
speedy disposition thereof. See Commonwealth v. Martens, 500 
N.E.2d 282, 286 (Mass. 1986) (such a motion indicates that 
defendant is no longer willing to appear in the receiving state, 
but seeks only to invoke the dismissal provisions of the IAD), 
cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1041, 107 S. Ct. 1982 (1987); People v. 
Beamon, 268 N.W.2d 310, 314 (Mich. App. 1978) (a motion for 
speedy trial is not a sufficient request under Article III). 
Defendant's motion did not include a copy of his earlier written 
request for disposition, did not voice any intent that the 
request was still operative, and did not suggest that he was 
still seeking disposition of the Utah charges or would submit to 
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extradition should his motion be denied. Addendum H. See 
Crosland, 857 P.2d at 946-47 (finding a motion to dismiss 
insufficient to comply with Article III requirements for similar 
lapses); State v. Jensen, 818 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah 1991) (noting 
that a motion to dismiss did not invoke Article III). To the 
contrary, beginning with defendant's March 15, 1991, motion to 
dismiss, his actions illustrated that he was no longer interested 
in disposition of the Utah charges under the IAD, except by 
dismissal. See Crosland, 857 P.2d at 946-47. In contrast, 
Mauro, on which defendant relies, dealt with repeated requests 
for a speedy trial which, by their terms, expressed a 
corresponding willingness to resolve the charges which the 
receiving authorities pointedly ignored. Mauro, 43 6 U.S. at 3 64-
65, 98 S. Ct. at 1849-50. Hence, Mauro does not support 
defendant's position. 
Henacrer v. State, 716 P.2d 669 (Okla. Cr. 1986), also 
cited by defendant, should not be relied upon by this Court for 
several reasons, not the least of which is the Oklahoma court's 
fundamentally different interpretation of the IAD. That court 
finds that a prisoner has only one duty under the IAD--to ask his 
custodial authorities to prepare and send the requisite forms. 
Id.. 716 P.2d at 672-73. In contrast, Utah has found that a 
verbal request to the custodial authorities is wholly inadequate 
to meet a prisoner's duty under the IAD. Martin, 765 P.2d at 
856-57 (a request to custodial authorities must be in writing 
pursuant to the language of Article III) . Moreover, the Oklahoma 
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court in Henager determined that defendant's motion to dismiss, 
coupled with the Certificate of Inmate Status sent later, 
constituted the requisite request under Article III, but did not 
disclose the content of the motion or cite any authority for so 
holding. In contrast, the Utah Supreme Court has held that a 
simple motion to dismiss, depending on content, does not 
constitute the required notice under Article III. Crosland, 857 
P.2d at 946-47. Finally, the Henager court makes no mention of 
the "term of imprisonment" requirement or whether it may be met 
after the disposition request. Accordingly, Henager is not 
persuasive authority in this matter. 
Clearly, the Article III prerequisites could not be 
fulfilled in the order defendant urges in this case. Because 
defendant's pre-trial detainee status rendered his February 7, 
1990, request ineffective, his motion to dismiss does not qualify 
as de facto notice under Article III, and he refused to submit 
any written request subsequent to his federal sentencing and 
incarceration, defendant has not complied with the requirements 
of Article III and is not entitled to its protections. 
Consequently, the Utah and Sandstone authorities appropriately 
proceeded under Article IV. See State v. Dolack, 533 P.2d 1282 
(Kan. 1975) (no IAD violation occurred where, after defendant 
sent a letter to the prosecutor, the prosecutor informed 
defendant of how to do an appropriate Article III request, and 
defendant refused to do so; the prosecutor then appropriately 
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pursued custody of defendant through Article IV); see also 
subsection (B)(3), infra. 
2. Assuming Article III Was Activated, No IAD 
Violation Occurred Where Trial Began Within The 
Required 18 0 Days 
The 180-day period within which trial must be had 
pursuant to Article III may be tolled for various reasons, 
including: when defendant is "unable to stand trial", when the 
proceedings are continued "for good cause", and when delays in 
bringing defendant to trial are chargeable to defendant.15 
Defendant concedes that delays attributable to him are excludable 
from the 180-day computation under Article III. Br. of App. at 
21. However, he makes no attempt to identify the amount of delay 
he caused. After excluding the appropriate periods from the 
computation in this case, and assuming, arguendo, that 
defendant's incarceration on June 4, 1991, triggered the IAD, as 
he contends, it becomes clear that there was no IAD violation as 
defendant's trial commenced within 180 days.16 
15
 Article VI (a) provides: 
(a) In determining the duration and expiration dates 
of the time periods provided in Articles III and IV of 
this agreement, the running of said time periods shall be 
tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is unable 
to stand trial, as determined by the court having 
jurisdiction of the matter. 
Article III(a) provides: 
. . . provided that for good cause shown in open court, 
the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court 
having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary 
or reasonable continuance. 
16
 By asserting this argument, the State does not concede that 
defendant ever invoked his Article III protections. The point is 
that, even if defendant's argument had merit, he is still not 
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Delay which has been attributed to defendant and 
excluded from an IAD computation includes: 1) delay caused by 
various defense motions and dilatory tactics, United States v. 
Dawn, 900 F.2d 1132, 1136-37 (7th Cir.) (involving Utah 
prisoner), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 949, 111 S. Ct. 368 (1990); 
United States v. Walker, 924 F.2d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 1991); Hudson 
v. Moran, 760 F.2d 1027, 1030-31 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 474 
U.S. 981, 106 S. Ct. 387 (1985); United States v. Scheer, 729 
F.2d 164, 168-69 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Moon v. State, 375 
S.E.2d 442, 446-47 (Ga. 1988) (involving more than 60 pre-trial 
motions to be resolved before trial could begin, and an agreement 
by defendant to a trial setting outside the IAD period), cert. 
denied, 499 U.S. 982, 111 S. Ct. 1638 (1991); People v. Harlan, 
344 N.W.2d 300, 301-02 (Mich. App. 1983); Knox v. State, 848 P.2d 
1354, 1359 (Wyo. 1993) (involving motions to disqualify the trial 
judge plus 11 other pre-trial motions); 2) continuances granted 
at defendant's request or with his consent, Brown v. Wolff, 706 
F.2d 902, 907 (9th Cir. 1983); Commonwealth v. Corbin, 519 N.E.2d 
1367, 1369-70 (Mass. App. 1988); People v. Vrlaku, 504 N.Y.S.2d 
612, 615-17 (N.Y. Sup. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 523 
N.Y.S.2d 143 (1988); 3) delays caused by defendant's unreadiness 
for trial, Harlan, 344 N.W.2d at 301-02; State v. Sallee. 624 
S.W.2d 184, 186 (Mo. App. 1981); and 4) delays attributable to 
defendant's struggle against extradition, People v. Uplinaer. 370 
N.E.2d 1054, 1058 (111. 1977); Green v. State, 557 N.E.2d 1032, 
entitled to the relief he seeks. 
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1037-38 (Ind. App. 4 Dist. 1990) (defendant instructed the 
custodial warden to resist the charging state's efforts to obtain 
temporary custody); Commonwealth v. Stance, 428 A.2d 226, 227-28 
(Pa. Super. 1981) (defendant was unavailable for trial during 
time he refused extradition and remained in sending state). See 
generally State v. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137, 142 (Utah 1989) 
(delays caused by defendant toll defendant's constitutional 
speedy trial rights, including time related to defense motions 
and substitutions of defense counsel). 
In this case, defendant failed to exercise good faith 
or diligent effort in proceeding under the IAD and he, in fact, 
contributed to Utah's inability to dispose of its charges more 
quickly. The delays attributable to defendant are significant 
and should be factored into the IAD calculation in order to avoid 
rewarding him for his delaying tactics. See State v. Velasguez, 
641 P.2d 115, 116-17 (Utah 1982) (under intrastate rule, delay 
attributable to defendant is not included in the statutory 
computation because "[w]hen the prisoner himself acts to delay 
trial . . . he indicates his willingness to temporarily waive 
this protection; the purpose behind the statute thus no longer 
exists, (citation omitted)"). Assuming, arguendo, that the 180-
day period began on June 4, 1991, as defendant contends, 
defendant's efforts to resist extradition delayed Utah's ability 
to comply with Article III and negate any assertion that 
defendant was willing to cooperate in good faith in disposing of 
the charges. See Uplinger, 370 N.E.2d at 1058. Defendant's 
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express waivers of his speedy trial rights after returning to 
Utah and his multiple pre-trial filings led the trial court into 
granting multiple trial continuances at defendant's request. It 
would be incongruous to provide defendant with the protection of 
the speedy trial provision of the IAD when he manifested the 
clear intent to frustrate the ability of the Utah authorities to 
comply with the IAD. State v. Jensen, 818 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah 
1991); Uplinaer, 370 N.E.2d at 1058. Fundamental fairness 
dictates that he not be rewarded for his actions. 
There were 589 days from the time defendant claims he 
completed the Article III prerequisites on June 4, 1991, until 
trial began on January 13, 1993. The delay attributable to 
defendant during this period is as follows: 
DAYS ATTRIBUTED 
DATES EVENT TO DEFENDANT 
July 7, 1991 Defendant's letter to 228 
to Utah authorities showing his 
intent to resist extradition 
(R. 332). 
Feb. 19, 1992 Defendant arrives in Utah 
under Art. IV (R. 252).17 
Feb. 24, 1992 Defendant files a motion to 39 
to dismiss (R. 214-34). 
April 2, 1992 Defendant's motion is quashed 
(R. 345-46). 
17
 Nothing in the record suggests that defendant ever abandoned 
his resistance to extradition. However, his voluntary dismissal of 
his federal habeas appeal, albeit on a mistaken belief that all 
charges had been dismissed, may arguably demonstrate his 
acquiescence to extradition (R. 255, 364). Even utilizing the 
December 4, 1991, entry of the order dismissing the federal action, 
the Utah trial occurred 161 days into the Article III period. 
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May 1, 1992 Defendant files a motion to 158 
to dismiss (R. 211-34) (during 
this time, defendant also files 
numerous other motions, as 
detailed in the Statement of 
the Case). 
Oct. 5, 1992 Defendant's motions are denied 
(R. 568-73) . 
Oct. 26, 1992 Trial is continued from Oct. 24 
to to Nov. at defendant's request 
Nov. 18, 1992 in a hearing on Oct. 19 
(R. 581-83) (during this time, 
defendant also files an 
interlocutory appeal and three 
motions). 
Nov. 19, 1992 Trial is continued from Nov. 56 
to to Jan. per defendant's 
motion in a hearing held Nov. 
9, 1992 (R. 734-37) (date of 
motion unknown; motion granted 
Nov. 23, 1992) (during this 
time, defendant files three 
additional motions). 
Jan. 13, 1993 Trial begins (R. 804-08). 
TOTAL: 505 
Once the delay attributable to defendant is considered, 
defendant's trial began only 84 days into the Article III period. 
Accordingly, there was no IAD violation, and defendant is not 
entitled to relief. 
C. The State Did Not Violate The Speedy Trial Provisions Of 
Article IV Where Trial Began Within The Required 12 0 Days 
Defendant contends that the 120-day period under 
Article IV was not met because there is no evidence in the record 
that defendant was "unable to stand trial" under Article VI, and 
there is no ruling from the trial court regarding a good cause 
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delay. Br. of App. at 25-26.18 Although the case cited by 
defendant, United States v. Birdwell, 983 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 
1993), supports defendant's position, the overwhelming weight of 
authority is to the contrary: delays attributable to defendant 
are excluded from the time computations under the IAD, including 
Article IV. See United States v. Walker, 924 F.2d 1, 5-6 (1st 
Cir. 1991) (120 days tolled by defense motions); People v. 
Harlan, 344 N.W.2d 300, 301-02 (Mich. App. 1983) (Article IV 
period is tolled for any period of delay necessary to accommodate 
defendant); State v. Knox, 848 P.2d 1354, 1359 (Wyo. 1993) (120 
days tolled by defendant's numerous pre-trial motions); see also 
authorities cited in subsection (B)(2), supra. Moreover, 
defendant, through his trial counsel, filed a letter on October 
20, 1992, which attributes part of the delay since his arrival in 
Utah to his own two motions to dismiss, and which admits that the 
November 18 trial date would fall within the 120-day period of 
Article IV (R. 583). Addendum D. The November setting was 
ultimately moved to January 13, 1993, based on defendant's own 
motion for a continuance and his express waiver of his IAD rights 
(R. 734-37) . Addendum C. Having led the trial court to believe 
that no IAD violation would arise from either the November or 
January dates, defendant cannot now assert error in these 
18
 Defendant's argument references, without a record cite, a 
demand he allegedly made on May 2, 1992, for an immediate 
arraignment and trial setting. Br. of App. at 26. The only 
document in the record filed by defendant near that day is his 
motion to dismiss, filed May 1, 1992 (R. 211-34) . The motion does 
not contain any request for an immediate arraignment or trial 
setting. 
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continuances. See Parsons v. Barnes, 23 0 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4-5 
(Utah 1994); State v. Smith. 776 P.2d 929, 932 (Utah App. 1989). 
Further, the absence of any express ruling from the trial court 
concerning "good cause" may be attributed to defendant's express 
waivers, which would have left the court no reason to believe 
that it was required to do more than it did. 
Trial began on January 13, 1993, 329 days after 
defendant arrived in Utah on February 19, 1992. As shown by the 
chart in the previous subsection, 277 days were attributable to 
defendant's delay, with the result that defendant was brought to 
trial within 52 days under Article IV. Consequently, defendant 
was brought to trial within the constraints of the 120-day period 
of Article IV, and he is not entitled to relief on appeal. 
D. Defendant's Claim Of An Article V Violation Does Not State A 
Claim For Which Relief Is Appropriate: Moreover, The Alleged 
Delay In Extraditing Defendant To Utah Under Article IV Does Not 
Entitle Defendant To Withdrawal Of His Pleas Or Dismissal 
Defendant argues that the State violated his rights 
under Article V(e) of the IAD because it did not "transport the 
defendant in a timely manner after the offer of temporary custody 
had been provided by federal authorities in Minnesota on August 
26, 1991." Br. of App. at 23. However, Article V(e) provides: 
At the earliest practicable time consonant with 
the purposes of this agreement, the prisoner shall be 
returned to the sending state. 
(Emphasis added.) Addendum A. In this case, the sending state 
is Minnesota, where the Sandstone facility is located. Nothing 
in Article V requires that Utah take immediate custody of 
defendant once an offer of temporary custody is made by 
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Sandstone, as defendant contends. Addendum A. Accordingly, 
defendant has not stated a cognizable claim for relief under 
Article V. 
Defendant also argues that the delay in returning him 
to Utah after Sandstone's offer of temporary custody violated 
Article IV. Br. of App. at 23. However, nothing in Article IV 
dictates that Utah take immediate custody of defendant. Addendum 
A. To the contrary, the provisions of Article IV contemplate an 
exchange of information between the two states, which necessarily 
takes time. Addendum A. Article IV also provides for a 3 0-day 
delay upon the motion of the prisoner or the custodial state's 
governor. IAD, Art. IV(a); Addendum A. Contrary to defendant's 
claim that "there were no administrative delays in the sending 
jurisdiction which would have prevented Defendant's return[,]" 
Br. of App. at 24, Utah authorities were delayed in their 
efforts to obtain custody of defendant by his resistance to 
extradition and his invocation of the 3 0-day period under Article 
IV(a), which the Sandstone authorities honored. Defendant cannot 
actively delay his return to Utah, then claim a right to 
dismissal of the charges because he was not returned fast enough. 
Further, dismissal under Article IV is neither required 
nor warranted for such a delay. The prisoner himself may remedy 
any delay between the charging state's written request for 
temporary custody and its extradition of the prisoner under 
Article IV by filing a written request for disposition under 
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Article III. Defendant failed to file any Article III request 
after Utah began its Article IV proceedings (Tr. 22). 
State v. Peterson, 585 P.2d 66 (Wash. 1978), relied 
upon by defendant, is inapplicable to this case because it 
involved interpretation of Washington's local speedy trial rule, 
which the Washington Supreme Court expressly distinguished from 
the interstate statute. Id. at 70. Unlike this case, it also 
involved a concession by the State that it made no effort to 
locate defendant or determine his availability despite 
defendant's multiple attempts to invoke the local rule. 
Moreover, the "diligent effort" requirement for which defendant 
cites the case expressly requires consideration of defendant's 
resistance to extradition as a factor in determining whether the 
state acted reasonably in its efforts to obtain custody. Id. at 
69. In this case, defendant's resistance to extradition and his 
invocation of Article IVs 30-day period would render Utah's 
actions reasonable. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT'S UNCONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA WAIVED HIS CLAIMS 
OF PRE-PLEA CONSTITUTIONAL SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS, AND HIS FAILURE TO INCLUDE THE ARGUMENT AS 
A BASIS TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA BELOW WAIVES THE ISSUE FOR 
APPEAL; HENCE, THIS COURT NEED NOT REACH THE MERITS OF 
DEFENDANT'S SECOND ARGUMENT 
The argument presented in this Point responds to the 
argument in Point II of defendant's brief. Br. of App. at 27-32. 
Defendant's second argument alleges that the State 
violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial under the 
United States Constitution, the Utah Constitution, and Utah 
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statutory law, because he was originally charged in October 1989 
but was not tried until January 1993. Br. of App. at 27-28. 
Outlining the constitutional speedy trial factors set forth in 
Barker v. Winao, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192 (1972), 
defendant claims that the delay entitles him to dismissal of the 
charges. Id. at 28-32. 
However, this Court need not reach defendant's argument 
that the State violated his constitutional speedy trial rights 
for two reasons. First, defendant claims that the trial court 
improperly denied his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas but 
fails to advance the appropriate standard of review or legal 
authorities relevant to a review of the trial court's ruling or 
withdrawal of his pleas. Utah R. App. P. 24(5) and (9) J 
Second, defendant waived this constitutional argument 
by his express waivers in open court (Addendum C), by the 
language of the plea agreement (R. 856; Addendum E), and by 
entering an unconditional guilty plea. See Point 1(B), supra; 
see also Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 
1608 (1973) ("When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in 
open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he 
is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims 
relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that 
occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.11); State ex rel. 
E.G.T., 808 P.2d 138, 139 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Serv, 758 
P.2d 935, 937-38 (Utah App. 1988). 
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Even if defendant intends that the alleged 
constitutional violation constitutes a basis for withdrawal of 
his guilty pleas, the argument would not properly be before this 
Court because it was not presented to the trial court in 
defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas (R. 872-75; Addendum F), 
and defendant makes no assertion of plain error or exceptional 
circumstances to excuse his failure to present the issue to the 
trial court. See State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 705 n.2 (Utah 
App. 1993); State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 917-18 (Utah App. 
1992) . 
POINT IV 
THIS COURT NEED NOT REACH DEFENDANT'S ASSERTIONS OF DUE 
PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATIONS OR HIS RES 
JUDICATA CONCERNS BECAUSE THEY WERE WAIVED BY ENTRY OF 
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEAS, AND BECAUSE THEY ARE RAISED 
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL AND NO CLAIM OF PLAIN 
ERROR OR EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES IS MADE 
The argument presented in this Point responds to the 
argument in Point III of defendant's brief. Br. of App. at 32-
36. 
In his final argument, defendant contends that the Utah 
charges should be dismissed because his due process and equal 
protection rights were violated by the State or the lower court 
in the following ways: 
1. the State filed no probable cause statement, 
despite his arrest on July 13, 1989; 
2. the court did not set a trial date within 30 days 
of his not guilty plea on October 19, 1989; 
3. defendant was not present when the district court 
dismissed the first information on November 6, 1989, or 
held a hearing on March 26, 1990; 
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4. the court failed to include in its order of 
dismissal dated November 6, 1989, the express reasons 
for the ruling; 
5. the State did not give defendant a copy of the 
information dated December 21, 1989, until twenty-six 
months after it was filed; 
6. the court did not appoint counsel to represent 
defendant in response to his requests of June 5, 1990, 
March 16, 1991, and April 30, 1991; and 
7. the prosecutor did not inform the district court of 
the December 21 information filed in the circuit court 
so that the district court could forward defendant's 
alleged IAD request to the appropriate court or respond 
to defendant. 
Br. of App. at 32-35. Defendant also contends that the 
prosecutor failed to inform either the district court or the 
federal court of the existence of the second information, thereby 
resulting in rulings from both courts that no charges were 
pending against defendant. Id. at 35-36. He argues that the 
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel require that 
these rulings be enforced, thereby dictating that the charges 
against him be dismissed. Id. 
In addition to the fact that these arguments were 
necessarily waived by entry of the unconditional guilty pleas, 
State ex rel. E.G.T.. 808 P.2d 138, 139 (Utah App. 1991) (a 
voluntary guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional issues); State 
v. Perank. 858 P.2d 927, 931 n.3 (Utah 1992) (res judicata is 
waivable), all except the res judicata issue are raised for the 
first time on appeal. Because defendant asserts neither plain 
error nor exceptional circumstances, this Court should not 
address the merits of these claims. State v. Martinez. 848 P.2d 
C7 
702, 705 n.2 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 
917-18 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 925 
(Utah App. 1991). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant seeks a remand to the district court for 
withdrawal of his guilty pleas, together with directions to the 
lower court to dismiss the charges against him. 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm defendant's convictions and 
sentences. / 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this C&Q day of July, 1994. 
JAN GRAHAM, 
Attorney 
C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
interstate Agreement On Detainers 
77-29-2 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
trial State v Carlsen, 25 Utah 2d 136, 478 
P2d 326 (1970) 
Premature request. 
Defendant's request for final disposition was 
premature where proceedings had advanced 
only to point of filing of complaint against htm, 
since person accused of felony must plead to 
and be tried under information or indictment 
State v. Belcher, 25 Utah 2d 37, 475 P 2d 60 
(1970) 
Defendant, who was not finally tried within 
ninety days from date of request made pursu-
ant to former § 77-65-1, was not entitled to 
exoneration because his request was prema-
ture since only complaint for felony charge had 
been filed, good cause was shown for granting 
continuance, and insanity defense had pre-
cluded earlier trial. State v. Belcher, 25 Utah 
2d 37, 475 P 2d 60 (1970) 
Parolee who, after being arrested on com-
plaint, filed petition requesting final disposi-
tion of case within ninety days was denied re-
lief under former ft 77-65-1, where trial was 
held more than ninety days after filing date of 
petition but within ninety days of filing of in-
formation State v. Clark, 28 Utah 2d 272,501 
P 2d 274 (1972) 
Former ft 77-65-1 did not apply to unfiled 
charges and defendant was not entitled to as-
sert ninety-day limitation upon prosecution for 
any crime discovered or undiscovered he might 
have committed State v. Farnsworth, 30 Utah 
2d 435, 619 P 2d 244 (1974). 
Prosecutor's delay. 
A prosecutor's delay in filing charges does 
not violate defendant's right to a speedy trial 
where no tactical advantage is gained over the 
defendant, since a strict rule that prosecutors 
must file charges as soon as probable cause 
exists could result in the charging of innocent 
people, and could also hamper the investiga-
tion of crimes State v Smith, 699 P 2d 711 
(Utah 1985) 
Warden's delay. 
Any attempt by the warden to retain, beyond 
a reasonable time, a prisoner's request for final 
disposition of pending charges, his failure to 
complete the required certificate, or any at-
tempt to misdirect the request and certificate, 
would violate prisoner's right to a speedy trial 
and provide a basis for judicial relief State v 
Taylor, 538 P 2d 310 (Utah 1975) 
Written demand. 
Defendant's reliance on his notice of appear-
ance to commence the running of the 120-day 
period within which his trial had to be held 
was misplaced since the notice, which merely 
contained a plea of "not guilty" and a request 
that he be granted a trial upon the charge, was 
not delivered to the warden, and did not specify 
the nature of the charge or the court where the 
charge was pending State v. Viles, 702 P2d 
1175 (Utah 1985) 
A letter from defendant's federal probation 
officer to a Utah county attorney which did not 
specify the nature of the charges pending 
against defendant, was merely an inquiry and 
did not trigger the statutory right to demand 
trial State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447 (Utah 
1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am, Jur. 2d. — 21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal 
Law §5 849-875. 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law •» 573-576. 
77-29-2. Duty of custodial officer to inform prisoner of 
untried indictments or informations. 
The warden, sheriff or custodial officer shall promptly inform a prisoner in 
writing of the source and contents of any untried indictments or informations 
against that prisoner concerning which he has knowledge and of that pris-
oner's right to make a request for final disposition thereof. 
History: C. 1963, 77-29-2, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, ft 2. 
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77-29-3. Chapter inapplicable to incompetent persons. 
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any person while adjudged 
to be incompetent to proceed under Chapter 15. 
History: C. 1963, 77-29-3, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, ft 2. 
77-29-4. Escape of prisoner voids demand. 
Escape from custody by a prisoner after delivery of the written demand 
referred to in Subsection 77-29-1(1) shall void the request. 
History: C. 1963, 77-29-4, enacted by L. 
1960, ch. 15, ft 2. 
77-29-5. Interstate agreement on detainers — Enactment 
into law — Text of agreement. 
The interstate agreement on detainers is hereby enacted into law and en-
tered into by this state with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in 
the form substantially as follows: 
The contracting states solemnly agree that: 
ARTICLE I 
The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers 
based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and difficulties in 
securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, 
produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and 
rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose 
of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such 
charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based 
on untried indictments, informations or complaints. The party states also find 
that proceedings with reference to such charges and detainers, when emanat-
ing from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of co-
operative procedures. It is the further purpose of this agreement to provide 
such co-operative procedures. 
ARTICLE II 
As used in this agreement: 
(a) "State" shall mean a state of the United States; the United States of 
America; a territory or possession of the United States; District of Colum-
bia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
(b) "Sending state" shall mean a state in which a prisoner is incarcer-
ated at the time that he initiates a request for final dispositions pursuant 
to Article III hereof or at the time that a request for custody or availabil-
ity ia initiated pursuant to Article IV hereof. 
(c) "Receiving state" shall mean the state in which trial is to be had on 
an indictment, information or complaint pursuant to Article III or Article 
IV hereof. 
651 
77-29-5 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
ARTICLE III 
(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal 
or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the contin-
uance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state 
any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a 
detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial 
within 180 days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting 
officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction writ-
ten notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposi-
tion to be made of the indictment, information or complaint; provided that for 
good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the 
court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable 
continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate 
of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of 
commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, 
the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time 
earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the 
state parole agency relating to the prisoner. 
(b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in para-
graph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, commis-
sioner of corrections or other official having custody of him, who shall 
promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecut-
ing official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. 
(c) The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody 
of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the source and contents of any 
detainer lodged against him and shall also inform him of his right to make a 
request for final disposition of the indictment, information or complaint on 
which the detainer is based. 
(d) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to para-
graph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for final disposition of all untried 
indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which detainers have 
been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose prosecuting official 
the request for final disposition is specifically directed. The warden, commis-
sioner of corrections or other official having custody of the prisoner shall 
forthwith notify all appropriate prosecuting officers and courts in the several 
jurisdictions within the state to which the prisoner's request for final disposi-
tion is being sent of the proceeding being initiated by the prisoner. Any notifi-
cation sent pursuant to this paragraph shall be accompanied by copies of the 
prisoner's written notice, request, and the certificate. If trial is not had on any 
indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the return 
of the prisoner to the original place of imprisonment, such indictment, infor-
mation or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court 
shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. 
(e) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to a para-
graph (a) hereof shall also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition with 
respect to any charge or proceeding contemplated thereby or included therein 
by reason of paragraph (d) hereof, and a waiver of extradition to the receiving 
state to serve any sentence there imposed upon him, after completion of his 
term of imprisonment in the sending state. The request for final disposition 
shall also constitute a consent by the prisoner to the production of his body in 
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any court where his presence may be required in order to effectuate the pur-
poses of this agreement and a further consent voluntarily to be returned to the 
original place of imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of this agree-
ment. Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the imposition of a concurrent 
sentence if otherwise permitted by law. 
(f) Escape from custody by the prisoner subsequent to his execution of the 
request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall void the 
request. 
ARTICLE IV 
(a) The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried indict-
ment, information or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have a prisoner 
against whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a term of imprison-
ment in any party state made available in accordance with Article V(a) hereof 
upon presentation of a written request for temporary custody or availability to 
the appropriate authorities of the state in which the prisoner is incarcerated; 
provided that the court having jurisdiction of such indictment, information or 
complaint shall have duly approved, recorded and transmitted the request; 
and provided further that there shall be a period of 30 days after receipt by 
the appropriate authorities before the request be honored, within which pe-
riod the governor of the sending state may disapprove the request for tempo-
rary custody or availability, either upon his own motion or upon motion of the 
prisoner. 
(b) Upon receipt of the officer's written request as provided in paragraph (a) 
hereof, the appropriate authorities having the prisoner in custody shall fur-
nish the officer with a certificate stating the term of commitment under which 
the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be 
served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole 
eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relat-
ing to the prisoner. Said authorities simultaneously shall furnish all other 
officers and appropriate courts in the receiving state who have lodged de-
tainers against the prisoner with similar certificates and with notices inform-
ing them of the request for custody or availability and of the reasons therefor. 
(c) In respect of any proceeding made possible by this article, trial shall be 
commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in 
the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his 
counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant 
any necessary or reasonable continuance. 
(d) Nothing contained in the article shall be construed to deprive any pris-
oner of any right which he may have to contest the legality of his delivery as 
provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but such delivery may not be opposed or 
denied on the ground that the executive authority of the sending state has not 
affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery. 
(e) If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint contem-
plated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original place of 
imprisonment pursuant to Article V(e) hereof, such indictment, information 
or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall 
enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. 
653 
77-29-5 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
ARTICLE V 
(a) In response to a request made under Article III or Article IV hereof, the 
appropriate authority in a sending state shall offer to deliver temporary cus-
tody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in the state where such 
indictment, information or complaint is pending against such person in order 
that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had If the request for final 
disposition is made by the prisoner, the offer of temporary custody shall ac-
company the written notice provided for in Article III of this agreement In 
the case of a federal prisoner, the appropriate authority in the receiving state 
shall be entitled to temporary custody as provided by this agreement or to the 
prisoner's presence in federal custody at the place for trial, whichever custo-
dial arrangement may be approved by the custodian 
(b) The officer or other representative of a state accepting an offer of tempo-
rary custody shall present the following upon demand 
(1) Proper identification and evidence of his authority to act for the 
state into whose temporary custody the prisoner is to be given 
(2) A duly certified copy of the indictment, information or complaint on 
the basis of which the detainer has been lodged and on the basis of which 
the request for temporary custody of the prisoner has been made 
(c) If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary 
custody of said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment, 
information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is 
not brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or Article IV 
hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, infor-
mation or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the 
same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any 
force or effect 
(d) The temporary custody referred to in this agreement shall be only for 
the purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges contained in 
one or more untried indictments, informations or complaints which form the 
basis of the detainer or detainers or for prosecution on any other charge or 
charges arising out of the same transaction Except for his attendance at court 
and while being transported to or from any place at which his presence may be 
required, the prisoner shall be held in a suitable jail or other facility regularly 
used for persons awaiting prosecution 
(e) At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this 
agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending state 
(f) During the continuance of temporary custody or while the prisoner is 
otherwise being made available for trial as required by this agreement, time 
being served on the sentence shall continue to run but good time shall be 
earned by the prisoner only if, and to the extent that, the law and practice of 
the jurisdiction which imposed the sentence may allow 
(g) For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as pro-
vided in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to remain 
in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state and any 
escape from temporary custody may be dealt with in the same manner as an 
escape from the original place of imprisonment or in any other manner per-
mitted by law 
(h) From the time that a party state receives custody of a prisoner pursuant 
to this agreement until such prisoner is returned to the territory and custody 
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of the sending state, the state in which the one or more untried indictments, 
informations or complaints are pending or in which trial is being had shall be 
responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay all costs of transporting, caring 
for, keeping and returning the prisoner The provisions of this paragraph 
shall govern unless the states concerned shall have entered into a supplemen-
tary agreement providing for a different allocation of costs and responsibili-
ties as between or among themselves Nothing herein contained shall be con-
strued to alter or affect any internal relationship among the departments, 
agencies and officers of and in the government of a party state, or between a 
party state and its subdivisions, as to the payment of costs, or responsibilities 
therefor 
ARTICLE VI 
(a) In determining the duration and expiration dates of the time periods 
provided in Articles III and IV of this agreement, the running of said time 
periods shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is unable to 
stand tnal, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of the matter. 
(b) No provision of this agreement, and no remedy made available by this 
agreement, shall apply to any person who is adjudged to be mentally ill. 
ARTICLE VH 
Each state party to this agreement shall designate an officer who, acting 
jointly With like officers of other party states, shall promulgate rules and 
regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this 
agreement, and who shall provide, within and without the state, information 
necessary to the effective operation of this agreement. 
ARTICLE Vm 
This agreement shall enter into full force and effect as to a party state when 
such state has enacted the same into law A state party to this agreement may 
withdraw herefrom enacting a statute repealing the same However, the with-
drawal of any state shall not affect the status of any proceedings already 
initiated by inmates or by state officers at the time such withdrawal takes 
effect, nor shall it affect their rights in respect thereof. 
ARTICLE IX 
This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes 
The provisions of this agreement shall be severable and if any phrase, clause, 
sentence or provision of this agreement is declared to be contrary to the Con-
stitution of any party state or of the United States or the applicability thereof 
to any government, agency, person or circumstance is held invalid, the valid-
ity of the remainder of this agreement and the applicability thereof to any 
government, agency, person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby If 
this agreement shall be held contrary to the Constitution of any state party 
hereto, the agreement shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining 
states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable 
matters 
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History: C. 1953, 77-20-5, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, ft 2. 
NOTES TO 
ANALYSIS 
Compliance standard. 
Detainer required. 
Jurisdiction retained by sending state. 
Notice to prosecutor and court. 
Prisoner received under Western Interstate 
Corrections Compact. 
Sentence interrupted for return to sending 
state. 
Time limit for trial. 
—Between counties. 
—Delay caused by defendant. 
Compliance standard. 
The standard to which administration of the 
Interstate Agreement on Detainers should be 
held is substantial compliance with the terms 
of the agreement and fundamental fairness in 
the overall resul t Hearn v. State, 642 P.2d 757 
(Utah 1982). 
The substantial compliance doctrine does not 
dispense with the need for a written notice and 
request by the prisoner under Article IH(b) of 
this section. State v. Martin, 765 P.2d 854 
(Utah 1988). 
Detainer required. 
Under Article IH(a) of this section, a de-
tainer must be lodged against the prisoner be-
fore he can invoke Article III protection. State 
v. Martin, 765 P.2d 854 (Utah 1988). 
Ju r i sd ic t ion retained by sending state. 
California prisoner's transfer to Utah did not 
constitute waiver and relinquishment of juris-
diction by California or satisfaction of the Cali-
fornia judgment where the transfer was made 
pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on De-
tainers as requested by the prisoner; fact that 
prisoner entered guilty pleas to misdemeanors 
and not felonies in Utah, and fact that Utah 
sentence provided that time be served in the 
county jail with such sentence to run concur-
rently with the California sentence, had no ef-
fect on California's continued jurisdiction over 
the prisoner. Buchanan v. Hayward, 663 P.2d 
70 (Utah 1983). 
Notice to prosecutor and court. 
A communication solely to the prosecuting 
officer does not meet the requirements of Arti-
cle IH(a) of this section calling for written no-
tice to both the prosecuting officer and the ap-
propriate court of the prosecuting officer's ju« 
DECISIONS 
risdiction. State v. Martin, 765 P.2d 854 (Utah 
1988). 
Prisoner received u n d e r Western Inter-
state Correct ions Compact . 
Where prisoner was convicted and sentenced 
by an Oregon court and was transferred to 
Utah for confinement in the Utah State Prison 
under the Western Interstate Corrections Com-
pact, § 77-28-1 et seq., and, while in confine-
ment in Utah, California made a request under 
the Interstate Agreement on Detainers to Utah 
officials for temporary custody of prisoner to 
try him on kidnapping and rape charges pend-
ing in California, Utah officials did not have 
authority under the Western Interstate Correc-
tions Compact or the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers to transfer custody of prisoner to 
California without the direction or approval of 
the Oregon authorities; California could obtain 
such approval by making its request directly to 
Oregon or by having its request forwarded by 
the Utah officials to the Oregon authorities. 
Gibson v. Morris, 646 P.2d 733 (Utah 1982). 
Sentence interrupted for return to sending 
state. 
There was substantial compliance with the 
terms of this Agreement and no violation of 
fundamental fairness in the fact that prisoner's 
service of sentence in the receiving state was 
interrupted for his return to the sending state 
and is to be resumed, pursuant to detainer 
from the receiving state, after he completes 
service of his sentence in the sending state and 
an intervening federal sentence. Hearn v. 
State, 642 P 2d 757 (Utah 1982). 
Time limit for trial. 
—Between counties. 
An arrest warrant filed by one county with a 
sister county does not constitute an Article IV 
request for temporary custody of a sending 
state's prisoner so as to trigger the 120-day 
time limit. State v. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137 
(Utah 1989). 
—Delay caused by defendant. 
If the defendant himself causes the trial to 
be delayed beyond the 120-day period in Arti-
cle IV(c), the defendant cannot assert the delay 
as a basis for dismissal of the charges against 
him. State v. Stillings, 709 P.2d 348 (Utah 
1985). 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Note, The State Uni- A.L.R. — Validity, construction, and appli-
versity's Place Among Overlapping Police Ju- cation of Interstate Agreement on Detainers, 
risdictions During a Student Mass Distur- 98 A.L.R.3d 160. 
bance, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 474. 
77-29-6. Interstate agreement — "Appropriate court" de-
fined. f 
The phrase "appropriate court" as used in the agreement on detainers shall, 
with reference to the courts of this state, mean any court with criminal juris-
diction in the matter involved. 
History: C. 1953, 77-29-6, enacted by L. 
1900, ch. 15, ft 2. 
77-29-7. Interstate agreement — Duty of state agencies 
and political subdivisions to co-operate. 
All courts, departments, agencies, officers and employees of this state and 
its political subdivisions are hereby directed to enforce the agreement on 
detainers and to co-operate with one another and with other party states in 
enforcing the agreement and effectuating its purpose. 
History: C. 1953, 77-29-7, enacted by L. 
1990, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-29-8. Interstate agreement — Application of habitual 
criminal law. 
Nothing in the agreement on detainers shall be construed to require the 
application of the habitual criminal law of this state to any person as a result 
of any conviction had in a proceeding brought to final disposition by reason of 
the use of said agreement. 
History: C. 1953, 77-29-8, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Habitual criminals, 
1960, ch. 15, I 2. ft* 76-8-1001, 76-8-1002. 
77-29-9. Interstate agreement — Escape of prisoner while 
in temporary custody. 
Escape or attempt to escape from custody, whether within or without this 
state, while in the temporary custody of an authority of another state acting 
pursuant to the agreement on detainers shall constitute an offense against 
this state. Such escape or attempt to escape shall constitute an offense to the 
same extent and degree as an escape from the institution in which the pris-
oner was confined immediately prior to having been released to temporary 
custody, and shall be punishable in the same manner as an escape or attempt 
to escape from said institution. 
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ADDENDUM B 
Defendant's February 7, 1990, Letter 
February 7, 1990 
Sheriff of Mercer County 
Mercer County Jail 
Aledo, IL 61231 
RE: Pending Utah Charges and Federal 
Court (III) v. Jack Brocksmith 
Dear Sheriff: 
Pursuant to Ill.Rev.Stat., Ch. 38, Sec. 1003-8-9, et seq., 
I request a final dispoistion of all charges pending in Utah* 
I understand the Mercer County Sheriff is to forward this 
request with a statement of the terms of my present imprison-
ment to the prosecuting authorities. I also understand this 
request waives extradition on these charges. 
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ADDENDUM C 
Minute Entries Dated 
May 11, 1992 
June 8, 1992 
October 13, 1992 
And Order Continuing Trial 
ffflgnm&mfsreiXFmsTRiCT couRt 
** ••« TT t imTTTTi i i J 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACK D BROCKSMITH, 
Defendant. 
(Jail) 
M^fMUTf^MfTRY' - NOTICE 
Date: MAY 11, 1992 
Case No: 921000051 FS 
Judge: GORDON J. LOW 
Clerk: LRD 
Tape: VIDEO Count: 
ARRAIGNMENT - NOT GUILTY PLEA 
This case is before the court for ARRAIGNMENT on the charges of 
(First Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(First Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(Third Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
Appearing for the State is GARY 0. MCKEAN. The defendant is 
present. Appearing as counsel for the defendant is BARBARA LACHMAR. 
A copy of the information is given to the defendant. The 
information is rea6 in open court. 
(1) 
(2) 
<3> 
(4) 
<5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
THEFT BY DEC 
THEFT BY DEC 
THEFT BY DEC 
THEFT BY DEC 
COMM FRAUD 
COMM FRAUD 
THEFT BY DEC 
COMM FRAUD 
THEFT BY DEC 
COMM FRAUD 
THEFT BY DEC 
THEFT BY DEC 
THEFT BY DEC 
THEFT BY DEC 
THEFT BY DEC 
Case Numbers 921000Q51£,F£ 
After the court examined the defendant, the defendant enters 
a plea of not guilty to: 
(1) THEFT BY DEC (First Degree Felony) 
(2) THEFT BY DEC (Second Degree Felony) 
(3) THEFT BY DEC (Second Degree Felony) 
(7) THEFT BY DEC (Second Degree Felony) 
(8) COMM FRAUD (Second Degree Felony) 
(9) THEFT BY DEC (Second Degree Felony) 
(13) THEFT BY DEC (Third Degree Felony) 
(14) THEFT BY DEC (Second Degree Felony) 
(15) THEFT BY DEC (Second Degree Felony) 
The court schedules the following on the date indicated: 
EVENT: MOTION HEARING ADDRESS: CACHE CO HALL OF JUSTICE 
DATE : JUNE 8, 1992 140 NORTH 100 WEST 
TIME : 9:19 AM LOGAN, UT 84321 
PLACE: Room 3 JUDGE : GORDON J. LOW 
The court orders that the defendant be remanded to the custody of 
the County Sheriff. 
MOTION TO DISMISS HAS BEEN FILED AND STATE HAS NOT RESPONDED YET--
COURT STATES THAT A MOTION FOR A SPEEDY TRIAL IS NOT APPLICABLE— 
THE CHARGES ARE READ AND THE DEFENDANT PLEADS NOT GUILTY—STATE 
REQUESTS A TRIAL SETTING—DEFENDANT WAIVES TIME—A MOTION HEARING IS 
TO BE SET AFTER THIRTY DAYS AND JURY TRIAL IS TO BE SET BEFORE SIXTY 
DAYS 
2.3b 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACK D BROCKSMITH, 
Defendant. 
(Jail) 
MINUTE ENTRY - NOTICE 
Date: JUNE 8, 1992 
Case No: 921000051 FS 
Judge: GORDON J. LOW 
Clerk: LRD 
Tape: VIDEO Count: 
Of 
<1> 
(2) 
(3) 
<4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
HEARING 
This case is before the court for MOTION HEARING on the charges 
THEFT BY DEC 
THEFT BY DEC 
THEFT BY DEC 
THEFT BY DEC 
COMM FRAUD 
COMM FRAUD 
THEFT BY DEC 
COMM FRAUD 
THEFT BY DEC 
COMM FRAUD 
THEFT BY DEC 
THEFT BY DEC 
THEFT BY DEC 
THEFT BY DEC 
THEFT BY DEC 
(First Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(First Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(Third Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
Appearing for the State is GARY O. MCKEAN. The defendant is 
present. Appearing as counsel for the defendant is BARBARA LACHMAR. 
DEFENSE HAS FILED TWO MOTIONS AND REQUESTS CONTINUATION—DEFENDANT 
WAIVES HIS SPEEDY TRIAL TIME—A TWO HOUR MOTION HEARING IS TO BE SET 
:>-?£ 
Case Number: 921000051 FS 
FOR ORAL ARGUMENT—THE TRIAL DATE THAT IS SET IS TO BE VACATED AND 
RE-SET 
The court orders that the defendant be remanded to the custody of 
the County Sheriff. 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACK D BROCKSMITH, 
Defendant. 
(Jail) 
MINUTE ENTRY - NOTICE 
Date: OCTOBER 13, 1992 
Case No: 921000051 FS 
Judge: GORDON J. LOW 
Clerk: LRD 
Reporter: VIDEO 
HEARING 
This case is before the court for PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE on the 
(First Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(First Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(Third Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
Appearing for the State is GARY 0. MCKEAN. The defendant is 
present. Appearing as counsel for the defendant is BARBARA LACHMAR. 
THE DEFENDANT IS PRESENT WITH COUNSEL—TWO MOTIONS HAVE BEEN DENIED— 
A THREE DAY JURY TRIAL IS TO BE SET SOON--ATD WILL FILE AN 
char 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(ID (12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
ges of 
THEFT BY DEC 
THEFT BY DEC 
THEFT BY DEC 
THEFT BY DEC 
COMM FRAUD 
COMM FRAUD 
THEFT BY DEC 
COMM FRAUD 
THEFT BY DEC 
COMM FRAUD 
THEFT BY DEC 
THEFT BY DEC 
THEFT BY DEC 
THEFT BY DEC 
THEFT BY DEC 
<zn°i 
Case Number: 921000051 FS 
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL AND OTHER MOTIONS—DEFENDANT WAIVES INTERSTATE 
AGREEMENT TIME 
The court orders that the defendant be remanded to the custody of 
the County Sheriff. 
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Gary O. McKcan **?* 
140 North 100 West 
Logan, Utah 84321 
RE: State v. Jack Brocksmith 
Crim. No. 921000051 
Dear Judge Low: 
The Defendant's Notion to Continue and the actions of the 
Court in this matter on November 9, 1992, were never confirmed in 
a written order. Because of the nature of the case and the need 
for a complete documented record, the State requests that the 
attached proposed Findings and Order be signed by the Court and 
placed in the Court's file in this case. A copy has been submitted 
to Barbara King Lachmar, counsel for Defendant. If she has any 
objections to this Order we request that they be made within a 
reasonable time and if no objection is pee^ived within a reasonable 
time that the Court sign the Order^s^swomitted. 
'fully submitted, 
Cache County Attorney 
GOM:cag 
cc: Barbara King Lachmar 
73? 
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R. PAUL VAN DAM - 3312 
Attorney General 
C. C. HORTON II - 1542 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for the State of Utah 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1016 
GARY O. McKEAN - 2201 
Cache County Attorney 
Attorney for the State of Utah 
110 North 100 West 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 752-8920 
Nov 10 I 07 Pii J3Z 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACK D. BROCKSMITH, 
Defendant. 
ORDER CONTINUING TRIAL 
District Court No: 921000051 
(Circuit Court No: 891001462) 
This matter came before the Court upon the Motion of the 
Defendant for a continuance of the three (3) day jury trial 
scheduled in this case, for the three (3) days beginning November 
18, 1992. The Defendant was present and was represented by his 
counsel, Barbara King Lachmar. The State was represented by James 
C. Jenkins, Deputy Cache County Attorney. 
The Court finds that the Defendant has filed a Petition with 
the Utah Supreme Court for an Interlocutory Appeal from the Order 
of this Court denying the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Motion 
i -^-#43 
NOV 2 3 1992 
^ 
to Invalidate transfer and request for relief; that petition is 
currently pending before the Utah Supreme Court; the Defendant 
claims that the issues raised in his Motion for Dismissal and 
Motion to Invalidate Transfer and Request for Relieve ought to be 
considered by the Utah Supreme through an Interlocutory Appeal 
prior to the commencement of trial; the Defendant has filed a 
Motion to Sever and an Amended Motion to Sever, a Motion to 
Suppress, and a Motion to Suppress Bank Records, which the 
Defendant claims need to be considered and heard by this Court and 
a decision made thereon prior to trial; that the Defendant has been 
advised and acknowledged that he is entitled to have his trial 
commence in this matter within the 120 day period provided by 
Article IV of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers as set forth in 
§77-29-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended; that the Defendant 
has knowingly and voluntarily in open court this day waived his 
right to a speedy trial and to the commencement of trial in the 
above-referenced case within the 120 day period provided by the 
Interstate Agreement on Detainers; that the Defendant has made 
this waiver and Motion to Continue after consultation with his 
legal counsel; that the Defendant has consented to the striking of 
the three (3) day jury trial commencing November 18, 1992, and to 
the re-scheduling of that trial to commence on January 13, 1993; 
and that the State has consented to the continuance and 
rescheduling of the trial to January 13, 1993. 
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It is thereupon ordered that the trial scheduled to commence 
on November 18, 1992, be continued and rescheduled to commence 
January 13, 1993; that the Defendant has waived his right to a 
speedy trial and to the commencement of a trial of this case within 
the 120 day period provided by the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers; and that the Defendant's Motion to Sever, Amended Motion 
to Sever, Motion to Suppress, Motion to Suppress Bank Records shall 
be heard on November 18, 1992, at 1:30 p.m.. 
DATED this ^ H day of November, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
\ x
 ^ GORDON J. LOW 
District Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT: 
Barbara King Lachmar 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the proposed 
foregoing Order for Continuance were delivered this date to Barbara 
King Lachmar, Attorney for Defendant, at her mailbox at the 
District Court. 
DATED this £4* day of November, 1992. 
Legdl Assistant/ 
FINDING2.DOC 
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ADDENDUM D 
Letter to District Court 
From Defense Counsel 
Dated October 20, 1992 
BARBARA K I N G L A C H M A R 
Attorney at Law , f\ r f 
Post Office Bo* 4432 u b J " 
Logan, Utan 84523-4432 - ^ >Q? 
(801) 753-2979 Qcl 2$ 4 1^ > a 
October 20, 1992 
Honorable Gordon J. Low 
First District Court 
140 North 100 West 
Logan, UT 84321 
Re: State of Utah v. Jack D. Brocksmith 
Dear Judge Low, 
I have reviewed the table provided by the State with regard to 
the time remaining, within which, the State must bring the above-
named defendant to trial under Article IV of the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers. 
According to my calculations, the State has 70 days from October 
5, 1992, in which to bring the defendant to trial. The defendant 
arrived in Utah on February 19, 1992. Defendant's attorney filed 
the first Motion to Dismiss on February 24, 1992. The State 
filed a Motion to Quash the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on 
March 17, 1992. The Motion to Quash was granted on April 2, 
1992. Defendant filed his second Motion to Dismiss on May 1, 
1992, defendant's Motion to Dismiss was denied by this Court on 
October 5, 1992. Accordingly, 50 days of the time since 
defendant arrived in Utah are attributable to the State and 70 
days remain from the date of denial of defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss during which defendant must be brought to trial. 
Defendant's trial is currently scheduled for November 18, 19 and 
20, 1992. Those dates are within 70 days from October 5, 1992 
and accordingly fall within the 120-day guideline under Article 
IV. 
Sincerely, 
Barbara King Laqjnmar 
Attorney for the Defendant 
cc: Jack D. Brocksmith 
Cache County Attorney FILED ) 
OCT 2 0 1992 
ADDENDUM E 
Statement of Defendant and Plea Agreement 
JAN GRAHAM - 1231 
Attorney General 
C. C. HORTON II - 1542 
Assistant Attorney General 
MICHAEL D. WIMS - 4720 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1016 
GARY 0. MCKEAN - 2201 
Cache County Attorney 
110 North 100 West 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 752-8920 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JACK D. BROCKSMITH, 
D.O.B. 04-05-38 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
AND PLEA AGREEMENT 
Circuit Ct. No. 891001462 
District Ct. No. 921000051 
Judge Gordon J. Low 
I, Jack D. Brocksmith, the Defendant in this case, 
state as follows with respect to my entry of pleas of guilty in 
the above-captioned case: 
1. I hereby confirm the entry of my voluntary plea 
of guilty to the following: 
Count 1: Communications Fraud, a Second Degree Felony; 
AND 
Count 2: Communications Fraud, a Second Degree Felony; 
AND 
Count 3: Communications Fraud, a Second Degree Felony; 
fco 
JAN 14)993 ^ . _ 
AND 
Count 4: Communications Fraud, a Second Degree Felony; 
AND 
Count 5: Communications Fraud, a Second Degree Felony; 
AND 
Count 6: Communications Fraud, a Second Degree Felony. 
2. I have received and read a copy of the Second 
Amended Information filed against me in this case. 
3. I understand the nature and the elements of the 
offense to which I am pleading guilty. 
4. The elements of the offenses for the crimes to 
which I am pleading guilty are as follows: 
Counts 1 through 6: Communications Fraud, Second 
Degree Felonies. 
A. Elements of the offenses: 
i. That the defendant, having devised a scheme or 
artifice to defraud another or to obtain from another money or 
anything of value by means of communicating false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, promises or material omissions; 
ii. On or about the dates alleged, in the counties 
alleged, in the State of Utah, communicate directly or indirectly 
with any person by any means; and 
ill. The communications were for the purpose of 
executing or concealing the scheme; and 
iv. The pretenses, representations, promises, or 
material omissions made or omitted were made or omitted 
2 
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intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the 
truth; and 
v. The total value of all money or things obtained or 
sought to be obtained from all victims by the scheme or artifice 
was $10,000 or more. 
B. My conduct for which I am criminally liable, which 
constitutes the elements of the crimes charged is as follows: 
COUNT 1 
I was an insurance agent representing Equitable Life 
and Casualty Co. On March 19, 1988, acting as an insurance 
agent, in Cache County, Utah, I represented to Gosta Eckstrom 
that I was selling him an annuity policy. I obtained a check 
from him for $40,000 for the policy and did not forward the money 
to the company. At the time I obtained his money, I knowingly 
did not tell him that I intended to use the money for any purpose 
other than purchasing the annuity policy. I acknowledge that my 
failure to tell him that I intended to use the money for other 
purposes constituted a material omission, and therefore I 
obtained the money through false pretenses or through material 
omissions. 
I understand the minimum and maximum sentence that 
may be imposed upon me for the offense. The penalty provided by 
statute for the offense in Count 1 is one to fifteen years 
imprisonment. I also understand that the offense carries a 
maximum fine of $10,000. 
3 
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COUNT 2 
I was an insurance agent representing 
Transamerica/Occidental Life. On August 19, 1988, September 24, 
1988, and October 28, 1988, in Cache and/or Davis County, Utah, 
acting as an insurance agent, I represented to Rose and Heber 
Hart that I was selling them an annuity policy. On the dates 
indicated, I obtained three $10,000 checks from Rose and Heber 
Hart for the policy and did not forward the money to the company. 
At the time I obtained their money, I knowingly did not tell them 
that I intended to use the money for any purpose other than 
purchasing the annuity policy. I acknowledge that my failure to 
tell them that I intended to use the money for other purposes 
constituted a material omission, and therefore I obtained the 
money through false pretenses or through material omissions. 
I understand the minimum and maximum sentence that 
may be imposed upon me for the offense. The penalty provided by 
statute for the offense in Count 2 is one to fifteen years 
imprisonment. I also understand that the offense carries a 
maximum fine of $10,000. 
COUNT 3 
I was an insurance agent representing 
Transamerica/Occidental Life. On November 1, 1988, in Davis 
and/or Cache County, Utah, acting as an insurance agent, I 
represented to Sybil Pollard that I was selling her an annuity 
policy. On the date indicated, I obtained a check for $30,000 
from her for the policy and did not forward the money to the 
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company. At the time I obtained her money, I knowingly did not 
tell her that I intended to use the money for any purpose other 
than purchasing the annuity policy. I acknowledge that my 
failure to tell her that I intended to use the money for other 
purposes constituted a material omission, and therefore I 
obtained the money through false pretenses or through material 
omissions. 
I understand the minimum and maximum sentence that 
may be imposed upon me for the offense. The penalty provided by 
statute for the offense in Count 3 is one to fifteen years 
imprisonment. I also understand that the offense carries a 
maximum fine of $10,000. 
COUNT 4 
I was an insurance agent representing Pioneer Life 
Insurance Company. On December 28, 1988, in Cache County, Utah, 
acting as an insurance agent, I represented to Jeanne Weeks that 
I was selling her an annuity policy. On the date indicated, I 
obtained a check for $20,000 from her for the policy and did not 
forward the money to the company. At the time I obtained her 
money, I knowingly did not tell her that I intended to use the 
money for any purpose other than purchasing the annuity policy. 
I acknowledge that my failure to tell her that I intended to use 
the money for other purposes constituted a material omission, and 
therefore I obtained the money through false pretenses or through 
material omissions. 
I understand the minimum and maximum sentence that 
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may be imposed upon me for the offense. The penalty provided by 
statute for the offense in Count 4 is one to fifteen years 
imprisonment. I also understand that the offense carries a 
maximum fine of $10,000. 
COUNT 5 
I was an insurance agent representing Pioneer Life 
Insurance Company. On December 8, 1988, April 27, 1989, May 8, 
1989, and June 15, 1989, acting as an insurance agent, I 
represented to Edith Bingham that I was selling her a nursing 
home policy. On December 8, 1988, I obtained a check for 
$1,471.00 from her for the policy and did not forward the money 
to the company. On April 27, 1989, I obtained a check for 
$2,020.00 from her for the policy and did not forward the money 
to the company. On May 8, 1989, I obtained a check for $406.00 
from her for the policy and did not forward the money to the 
company. On June 15, 1989, I obtained a check for $3,111.69 from 
her for the policy and did not forward the money to the company. 
At the time I obtained some of her money, I knowingly did not 
tell her that I had ceased being an agent for that company on 
February 13, 1989. Also at the time I obtained her money I 
knowingly did not tell her that I intended to use the money for 
any purpose other than purchasing the annuity policy. I 
acknowledge that my failure to tell her that I intended to use 
the money for other purposes and that I had ceased being an agent 
for the company constituted a material omission, and therefore I 
obtained the money through false pretenses or through material 
omissions. I acknowledge that the total value obtained from all 
victims exceeds $10,000. 
I understand the minimum and maximum sentence that 
may be imposed upon me for the offense. The penalty provided by 
statute for the offense in Count 5 is one to fifteen years 
imprisonment. I also understand that the offense carries a 
maximum fine of $10,000. 
COUNT 6 
On June 2, 1989, in Cache County, Utah, acting as an 
insurance agent, I represented to David Forsberg that I was 
selling him an insurance policy. On the date indicated, I 
obtained a check payable to "Retired Persons Insurance" for 
$1,039.00 from him for the policy. I did not forward the money 
to any insurance company. At the time I obtained his money, I 
knowingly did not tell him that I intended to use the money for 
any purpose other than purchasing an insurance policy nor that 
there was no such company by that name that was registered to 
conduct insurance business in the State of Utah. I acknowledge 
that my failure to tell him that I intended to use the money for 
other purposes and that no company by that name was registered to 
conduct business in the State constituted a material omission, 
and therefore I obtained the money through false pretenses or 
through material omissions. 
I understand the minimum and maximum sentence that 
may be imposed upon me for the offense. The penalty provided by 
statute for the offense in Count 6 is one to fifteen years 
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imprisonment. I also understand that the offense carries a 
maximum fine of $10,000. 
5. I am entering the guilty pleas voluntarily and 
with the knowledge and understanding of the following: 
a. I know that I have the right to be represented by 
an attorney and that an attorney will be appointed to represent 
me by the Court at no cost to me if I cannot afford one. 
b. I have not waived my right to legal counsel. My 
attorneys are Arden Lauritzen and Barbara Lachmar and I have had 
an opportunity to discuss this statement, my rights, and the 
consequences of my guilty pleas with my attorneys prior to the 
execution and filing of this statement and the entry of my guilty 
pleas before this Court. 
c. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury and 
that a unanimous verdict would be required for a conviction on 
any count before a jury, and that by pleading guilty I waive my 
right to a jury trial. 
d. I know that if I elect to have a trial, I have the 
right to confront and cross-examine any witnesses who testify 
against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorneys. I 
also know that if I qualify as an indigent, I have the right to 
have my witnesses subpoenaed at State expense to testify in court 
upon my behalf. I understand that I waive these rights by 
pleading guilty. 
e. I know I have the right to testify in my own behalf 
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but that if I choose not to do so, I cannot be compelled to 
testify or give evidence against myself and further realize that 
no adverse inferences may or will be drawn against me if I elect 
to exercise my right not to testify. I also realize that by 
pleading guilty I am waiving my right against self-incrimination 
and am admitting that I am guilty. 
f. I know that if I wish to contest the charges 
against me# I may enter a plea of "not guilty" and the matter 
will be tried. The State of Utah will have the burden of proving 
each element of each count beyond a reasonable doubt. I realize 
that by pleading guilty I waive such rights, and that by my pleas 
I am admitting all elements of the offenses to which I am 
pleading guilty. 
g. I know that under the Constitution of the State of 
Utah, if I were tried and convicted by a jury or by a judge, I 
would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the 
Utah Court of Appeals or, where allowed, to the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah, and that if I could not afford to pay the 
costs for such appeal, those costs would be paid by the state as 
required by law. 
h. I know the minimum and maximum sentence that may be 
imposed upon me for each offenses to which I enter a plea of 
guilty, including the possibility of consecutive sentences. I 
realize that the maximum possible sentence may be imposed upon me 
by my pleas of guilty and that such sentences may be for 
incarceration, fine, or a combination of both. I also know that 
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in addition to the imposition of any fine, an 85% surcharge as 
required by S63-63a-l, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, will 
be imposed and that I may be ordered by the Court to make 
restitution to any victim or victims of my crimes. 
i. I know that incarceration may be imposed by the 
Court to be served for consecutive periods for the counts to 
which I plead guilty, that is, I may be ordered by the Court to 
serve such sentences one after the other, rather than at the same 
time. I also know that if I am on probation, parole or awaiting 
sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted or 
to which I have pleaded guilty, my pleas in the present action 
may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. 
j. I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving 
my statutory and constitutional rights to file an appeal. 
k. I know that by entering pleas of guilty, I am 
admitting and do so admit, that I have committed the conduct 
alleged and that I am guilty of the crimes for which my pleas are 
entered. I further understand that I am pleading guilty 
unconditionally and that I am not preserving any issue for appeal 
relative to the Court's rulings on pre-trial motions or based 
upon statutory or constitutional challenges in this case. 
1. My pleas of guilty are the result of a plea 
negotiation conducted between my attorneys, on my behalf, and the 
prosecutors, including the Utah Attorney General's Office and the 
Cache County Attorney's Office. The terms of the plea 
negotiation are as follows: 
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In exchange for my pleas of guilty to 6 counts of 
communications fraud# second degree felonies, the State will 
recommend commitment to prison but will recommend that I receive 
concurrent sentences on all 6 counts, and will further recommend 
that the state sentences run concurrently with my federal 
incarceration for 5 counts of mail fraud. The State will further 
recommend to the Utah Board of Pardons that I serve a total of 
four years imprisonment with credit for time served since January 
31# 1991/ the date I was sentenced by the United States District 
Court for the Central District of Illinois for 5 counts of mail 
fraud. The State will further recommend that if I serve at least 
two additional years in federal prison from this date, that I 
need not be returned to the state of Utah but that I be permitted 
to be placed on interstate parole. I understand that the State 
will recommend that appropriate restitution be ordered by the 
Court. Since I am presently before the Court pursuant to the 
Interstate Agreement on Detainers, both parties understand that I 
will be returned expeditiously to the custody of the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons. The State will recommend that the Court make 
a specific finding that the I am not violent and have no 
propensity for violent acts, and that the Court and the State of 
Utah have no objection to my imprisonment in a minimum security 
facility, my partaking in work programs, alternate housing 
programs, halfway houses, and such other and further programs as 
may be deemed beneficial to me based solely on the criteria 
utilized by the Federal officials charged with my imprisonment 
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and without regard to the sentence imposed by order of this 
Court• 
m. I know that any plea negotiation with the 
prosecution is not binding upon the Court and is subject to 
approval by the Court, I further realize, if sentencing 
recommendations are allowed by the Court, including any promise 
or concession as to sentencing made by the prosecutor, that such 
recommendations are not binding upon the Court. I also know that 
any opinions which either of my attorneys, any of the 
prosecutors, or any other person may have expressed to me as to 
what they believe the Court may do with respect to sentencing are 
not binding upon the Court. 
6. No threats, coercion, or unlawful or undue 
influence of any kind have been made to induce me to enter a plea 
of guilty and no promises other than as set forth in this 
statement have been made to me. 
7. I have been advised of the time limits for filing 
a motion to withdraw my plea of guilty, specifically, that under 
S77-13-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, a request to 
withdraw a plea of guilty must be made by motion within 30 days 
after the entry of the plea. I further understand that my pleas 
may only be withdrawn upon a showing of good cause and with leave 
of the Court. 
8. I have reviewed this statement with my attorneys 
and I understand its provisions. I have gone over it carefully 
and have asked my attorneys to explain any words I may not have 
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understood. My attorneys have done so and I understand the 
meaning of all the words and phrases contained within this 
statement. I am satisfied with this statement and agreement. 
9. I have received legal advice and assistance from my 
attorneys and I am satisfied with such advice and assistance. 
10. I am years of age; I have attended school 
through the /y* grade and I can read and understand the 
English language. 
11. I was not under the influence of any controlled 
substance, drug, medication, or intoxicant when the decision to 
enter the pleas was made. I am not presently under the influence 
of any controlled substance, drug, medication or intoxicant. 
12. I believe myself to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of this 
statement and the entry of my pleas of guilty. I am not 
undergoing any counseling or treatment, mentally or medically, 
which would impair or prevent me from knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily entering my pleas of guilty or executing and 
filing this statement. 
13. I understand that this document sets out the 
entire plea agreement between myself and the State of Utah. 
DATED this //Aday of \JtfLA4UJLJu^ . 1993. 
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CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEYS 
We certify that we are the attorneys of record in this 
matter for JACK D. BROCKSMITH, the above Defendant; that we know 
he has read the statement and we have discussed it with him; and 
that we believe that he fully understands the meaning of its 
contents and is mentally and physically competent to execute it. 
To the best of our knowledge and belief, after an appropriate 
investigation/ the elements of the crimes and the factual 
synopsis of the Defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated 
and these, along with the other representations and declarations 
made by the Defendant in the foregoing statement, are accurate 
and true. 
j&uJdofJf^ 
Barbara Lachmar/ 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS 
We certify that we are the prosecuting attorneys for 
the State of Utah in this case against Jack D. Brocksmith, the 
Defendant. We have reviewed this statement of the Defendant and 
find that the declarations, including the elements of the offense 
of the charges and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's 
criminal conduct which constitute the offenses, are true and 
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correct. No improper inducements/ threats or coercion to 
encourage a plea have been offered the Defendant. The plea 
negotiations are fully contained in the statement or as 
supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable 
cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction 
of the Defendant for the offenses for which the pleas are entered 
and acceptance of the pleas would serve the public interest. 
G2^^i7^^. 
C. C. HORTON II 
Assistant Attorney General 
MICHAEL D. WIMS 
Assistant Attorney General 
G^U^. 
GARY 0. MCKEAN 
Cache County Attorney riey 
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ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing 
statement and certification, and based upon my observation of the 
Defendant in open court together with his responses made in open 
court to questions put to him by the Court, the Court finds the 
Defendant's pleas of guilty are freely and voluntarily made with 
full knowledge of his rights and the consequences of pleading 
guilty, and it is ordered that the Defendant's pleas of guilty to 
the charges set forth in the statement be accepted and entered as 
indicated. 
DATED this /^d^y of J/^y?i^^jf 
Gordon J. Low 
District Court Judge 
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ADDENDUM F 
Defendant's Pro Se 
Motion to Withdraw Pleas 
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ADDENDUM G 
Memorandum Decision on Defendant's Motion 
to Withdraw Pleas and Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying 
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Pleas 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
JACK D. BROCKSMITH, 
Defendant 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 921000051 
THIS MATTER IS BEFORE the Court upon the Defendant's Motion 
for Leave to Withdraw his plea. The Motion is supported by an 
Affidavit received the 26th day of February 1£93. The Court 
having reviewed the pleadings in this matter, together with the 
Affidavit, being cognizant of the circumstance surrounding the 
entry of the plea and being aware of the plea negotiation, it 
would appear that the State did act expeditiously in .this 
matter, that the Defendant was turned over to the federal 
authorities in a timely fashion, that transportation was 
provided by said federal authorities and was out of the hands 
and control of the State. No appropriate relief could be 
provided by granting the Motion. For the above reason and 
those stated in the State's Response the Motion is denied. 
& > & 
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MAR 2< 199 
ROLL NUMBER: ^*s 0 QO% 
State vs. Brocksmith 
#921000051 
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Counsel for the State is directed to prepare a formal Order 
in conformance herewith. 
Dated this c^f Aa? of M a rc h' 1993. 
BY THE COURT 
>rdon J. Low 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
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JAN GRAHAM - 1231 
Attorney General 
C. C. HORTON II - 1542 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for the State of Utah 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1016 
GARY o. MCKEAN - 2201 
Cache County Attorney 
Attorney for the State of Utah 
110 North 100 West 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 752-8920 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, ] 
VS •
 i 
JACK D. BROCKSMITH, ] 
Defendant. 
• FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF | LAW, AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
) MOTION TO WITHDRAW PLEA 
1 District Court No: 921000051 
I (Circuit Court No: 891001462) 
This matter came before the Court upon the Defendant's pro se 
motion to withdraw plea. The matter was considered by the Court ex 
parte, at the request of the State, and having reviewed both the 
motion, the State's response to that motion, and the Court's file, 
the Court enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law: 
Case No ^ JL 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court finds that: 
1. There was no condition of the plea negotiation nor any 
provision of the Judgment, Sentence and Commitment entered in this 
matter that imposed any specific deadline on the State for the 
transfer of the Defendant from the custody of the Cache County Jail 
to federal authorities, nor for the transportation of the Defendant 
to the Sandstone Federal Correctional Institution. 
2. Defendant fails to show good cause for the withdrawal of 
his plea as required by §77-13-6(2)(a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
as amended. 
3. Defendant's motion improperly raises issues regarding 
allegations of violations of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers 
and his right to a speedy trial. Those matters had previously been 
appropriately and lawfully considered by this Court, and the 
Defense motions with respect to those issues were lawfully denied. 
4. The Defendant, in fact, was transferred from the Cache 
County Jail to federal authorities in timely fashion, and trans-
ported in the custody of the Federal Authorities, on February 5, 
1993, four (4) days before the Defendant's Motion to Withdraw was 
actually filed. 
5. The State acted expeditiously in this matter. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1* The Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Plea is inadequate and 
fails to meet the criteria required by §77-13-6(2) (a), Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
2. Because of the Defendant's transfer and transportation 
from the Cache County Jail prior to the filing of his motion, the 
motion is moot. 
3. The Defendant fails to state any basis upon which the 
relief requested may be granted, and therefore the Motion to 
Withdraw should be denied. 
4. No appropriate relief can be provided by granting the 
motion. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, the Court has considered the matter ex parte , a t the request 
of the S t a t e , including a review of the Defendant's motion, the 
S t a t e ' s response to that motion, and the Court's f i l e . 
Therefore, i t i s hereby ordered that the Defendant's Motion 
to Withdraw Plea i s hereby denied. 
DATED t h i s A ^ d a y of JWVUA/ 1993. i ^ d a  / ^ff
BY THE COURT: 
)0N J. LOW 
S t r i c t Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the proposed 
foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying 
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw was delivered this date to Arden 
Lauritzen, Co-Counsel for Defendant, Barbara King Lachmar, Co-
Counsel for Defendant, at their respective mailboxes at the 
District Court. 
DATED this 29th day of April, 1993. 
mfMn 
Legal Assistant ' 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying 
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Plea to Jack Brocksmith, Defendant, 
at Sandstone Federal Correctional Institution, Sandstone, MN 
55072. 
DATED thisc£ff day of (J )A// , 1993. 
Xec ega/L Ass i s tant 
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ADDENDUM H 
Motion to Dismiss Charges 
Jl 
State of UtablS 
~ PLAINTIFF'S 
| EXHIBIT LOGAH DISTRICT 
Case No. 891000111 
KM 15 iUaiirSI 
V . 
Jack D. Brocksmith 
MOTION TO DISMISS CHARGES 
Now comes the defendant, Jack D. Brocksmith, pro-se and requests 
dismissal of all Utah charges. This motion is based on what the 
United States Supreme Court has identified as Four Key Factors 
which the court should consider in granting relief because of 
violations of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution. 
One: Length of Delay 
The speedy trial right was attached when the formal charge 
was made on 4 October 1989 runited States v. Marion [supra]; 
United States v. Lavasco 431 U.S. 783, 789 and 97 S.Ct. 2044 
(1977)]. Although the defendant has been in custody of Utah 
authorities since 11 July 1989 on an Illinois warrant, the 
Supreme Court has ruled that "presently" imprisoned on another 
charge and subject to criminal prosecution in another 
jurisdiction might cause the court to conclude that the "accused" 
is entitled to the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment [United 
States v, Gouveia, 704 F.2d 1116, 1120 (9 Cir 1983)]. Thus the 
defendant claims the protection of the Sixth Amendment since 11 
July 1989. 
A clearly tactical move by the State was done on 6 November 
1989 when all charges were dropped. Defendant was then held on 
3/6 
the Illinois warrant. Then on 23 December 1989 the state refiled 
charges against the defendant. These charges have been pendina 
since that date. At no time during incarceration in Utah, 
Illinois, or with federal authorities did defendant waive his 
right to a speedy trial or protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
The fact that I was incarcerated does not relieve a 
jurisdiction where criminal charges were pending from its Sixth 
Amendment duty: United States Constitution, Amendment VI Three 
interests are protected by the Sixth Amendment right to speedy 
trial: first, defendant's interest in avoiding prolonged 
imprisonment prior to trial; second, defendant's interest in 
avoiding prolonged psychological pressure and public suspicion 
while the charges are pending; and third, defendant's interest in 
disposing of charges before his defense is lost (Piukev v. 
Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 90 S.Ct. 1564 (1970); Smith v. Hooey, 393 
U.S. 374, 89 S.Ct. 575 (1969).) 
Two: Reason for Delay 
It will be clear that the prosecution purposefully delayed 
trial to hamper defendant's defense and to gain a tactical 
advantage. The record is transparent on that point. Such 
tactics should weigh against the prosecution rBaker v. Wings. 407 
UT 531] . Two tactical advantages gained by the prosecution in 
delaying trial will be revealed later in this motion. The court 
can clearly see the State's advantage in havina a trial now 
versus a trial when defendant was originally charged 4 October 
w 
1989. 
Three: Assertion of the Speedy Trial Right 
The defendant never waived his right to a speedy trial and, 
in fact, formally demanded such a right while in custody in 
Aledo, Illinois via the Interstate Detainer Act. However, the 
state rejected the demand because defendant had not been 
convicted or sentenced. This argument does not nullify 
defendant's formal demand for a speedy trial. The state has 
known since the time of that request of defendant's demand for a 
speedy trial and the assertion of this right is a matter of 
record. Such a demand adds significance to this motion. fGlass 
v. United States. 395 A»2d 802 (delay prior to assertion of 
right); Bethea v. United States, 395 A.2d 787, 792 (D.C. Ct. App. 
1978 (delay after assertion of right)? Reed v. United States, 383 
A.2d 319.] 
On 11 July 1990, exactly one year following his arrest and 
having been incarcerated the entire time, defendant finally went 
to trial on the Illinois charge of Theft by Deception. He was 
found not guilty of all but the misdemeanor charge of Deceptive 
Practices. The misdemeanor conviction is being appealed because 
the statute of limitations had long since expired. 
On 25 July 1990 the Mercer County Illinois Court sentenced 
defendant to time served and defendant's attorney noted for the 
record that defendant had served twice the time required by the 
Illinois law. The defendant was then immediately picked up on a 
federal detainer. 
X1A 
On 9 August 1990 defendant was released on bond from federal 
authorities and was free until he was convicted on 31 January 
1991. Despite the previous request for a speedy trial and the 
charges that were apparently still pending, the State of Utah 
made no move to detain defendant or bring him to trial. That 
period of time was nine days short of six months. 
Fourth: Prejudice 
The defendant holds that the aforementioned three factors 
demonstrate prejudicial behavior on the part of the State, but 
beyond that, that such tactics and maneuvers clearly prejudiced 
the defendant's case. In October 1989 defendant had retained 
counsel of his choice. Judge Lowe himself commented that the 
attorney, Mr. Hughes, was best suited to represent defendant 
because of his knowledge of the case. However, the defendant is 
no longer in a position where he can retain private counsel (see 
enclosed affidavit). 
The defendant has thus been denied counsel of his choice due 
to the maneuvers and tactics of the state. The defendant's plea 
of not guilty to the state charges still stands, but the state 
has now gained a tactical advantage of tremendous importance 
because on 31 January 1991 defendant was convicted of mail fraud. 
The deceptive practice conviction would have been employed had 
defendant testified in the federal trial to impeach his testimony 
and it is clear that the State of Utah would follow suit in any 
defense trial there. 
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It is therefore the assertion of the defendant that the 
State has violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and also 
the Utah Code 77-51-1 (1978). fBaker v. Wings, 407 U.S. 514, 925 
S.Ct. 2182 (1972).] That there can be no justification for the 
delay and that the delay is not supported by the record gives 
credibility to defendant's Motion for Dismissal of these Utah 
charges. It is further argued that the defense has been 
prejudiced fEscobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478f 84 S.Ct. 1758 
(1962) and United States v. Gouveia.1 It is further asserted 
that this case meets the criteria of United States v. Lamasco, 
431 U.S. 789; United States v. Marren, 404 U.S. 324-26; Fortaine 
v. California, 390 U.S. 593f 595, 596, 88 S.Ct. 1229 (1968); and 
Taylor v. United States, 238 F.2d 254 (D.C. Cir. 1956). All of 
these cases rule that if the prolonged delay adversely affects 
defendant's ability to prepare, persevere, and present evidence 
then his rights have been violated. 
The defendant earnestly prays that the Honorable court will 
grant relief on this matter. 
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